SEIT Part Seven – From Triumph to Earn This

The Final instalment brings together the holdings

The Oak Bloke

Oct 19, 2026

Dear reader,

Six investigations. Six very different investments. And rather a lot of numbers.

We’ve examined Primary Energy, Oliva, RED-Rochester, Odds ’n’ Sods, Driva and Onyx. Can we feel triumphant?

“DGI9, DGI9!” chant Detractors. And a six-times Severe Bear recovers just 26.1p per share. But that’s six investments going severely badly. What happens if some disappoint while others still deliver?

At the same 33p when I starting writing this series, SEIT’s share price trades approximately 58% below its March 2026 NAV of 77.8p. Is that pessimism justified, or is the market treating six very different investments as one collective and simultaneous set of disasters?

This final instalment reconciles all six investigations and tackles the question shareholders really care about: how much cash can we recover — and when?

Let the reckoning begin.

1. What we’ve discovered

The first thing worth recognising is that these aren’t six versions of the same investment.

Primary and Driva could provide early liquidity. Oliva generates cash while awaiting disposal. RED and Onyx may reward patience, while the Odds ’n’ Sods call for more opportunistic realisations.

Each has its own risks, valuation drivers and potential buyers.

A regulatory setback in Sweden doesn’t necessarily damage US solar installations or an industrial energy system in Rochester, NY.

But neither are these investments completely independent. They share exposure to financing conditions, buyer appetite and SEIT’s corporate borrowing.

Six different investments. Six different outcomes. One shared balance sheet.

The logic of assuming all six simultaneously suffer Severe Bear outcomes may be an unnecessarily pessimistic starting point.

2. From assets to shareholders

My six Base Case asset recoveries total £1,014.5m. But that’s not what shareholders receive.

SEIT must repay its £188m corporate revolving credit facility (RCF), alongside an estimated £44m of remaining central and wind-down costs and £10m of financing interest.

That leaves £772.5m, or 71.2p per share, in my Base Case.

Importantly, project-level debt is already reflected in our asset recovery estimates. Nor can we count Onyx’s recycled cash twice or deduct the notional RCF allocations used in earlier articles again.

These are estimates of eventual recovery, not promised distributions. The timing of receipts, debt repayment and shareholder returns remains crucial.

3. The Severe Bear, Bear, Base and Bull – 4096 outcomes – one picture

For the six articles covering the six assets, each with 4 scenarios I pondered how to represent this with a picture. The difficulty is there are 4 scenarios × 4 scenarios × 4 scenarios × 4 scenarios × 4 scenarios × 4 scenarios = 4096 outcomes.

Pie Chart? Waterfall? 4096 graphics and a Veeeeeeeeeeeery long article? Or just some illustrations?

And that’s why I love the following chart.

The dotted line represents SEIT’s share price of 33p. The outcomes range from 26.1p when everything suffers Severe Bear to 100p when everything delivers Bull.

What fascinates me is how many combinations still produce a nominal recovery in excess of 33p.

That’s not proof the odds favour shareholders. These 4096 scenarios aren’t equally likely. But it does show how much can go wrong without necessarily destroying the investment case.

4. How much can you Bear?

Interestingly a severe bear at one asset and a Base case for the rest yielded an interesting result.

RED is the biggest individual threat: its Severe Bear, with the other five investments at Base, reduces recovery to approximately 56.1p/share.

Even that remains comfortably above the 33p share price.

One asset having a disaster doesn’t necessarily mean SEIT shareholders do.

What is also apparent is that Oliva, Driva or Odds/Sods could have a disaster instead and it doesn’t really matter. A poor outcome at those still delivers huge upside overall.

5. Sacrificing assets in Saving Private Onyx

My “strategy” set out over six articles to grow Onyx while shielding it and focusing on realisations from Primary, then Oliva, Odds’n’Sods, then Red and Driva is deliberate.

Severe Bear at all other fivc assets even potentially via sacrificial disposal pricing, and a Bull Case for Onyx yields 44.5p.

In other words the key question for Onyx is do you “EARN THIS”.

Perhaps in 2030 in a metaphorical visit to a cemetery Onyx will say to its fallen co-assets:

“I hope that was enough. I hope that, at least in your eyes, I’ve earned what all of you have done for me.”

It then turns to its shareholders and asks:

“Tell me I’ve led a good life. Tell me I’m a good asset.”

They reply (satisfied with a 44.8p per share capital return outcome despite the disaster and carnage and row of white war graves at all of the other five):

“You are.”

6. Why the Base is below reported NAV

SEIT’s March 2026 NAV was 77.8p/share, against my modelled Base recovery of 71.2p.

NAV estimates the present value of future investment cash flows. My model estimates eventual shareholder recoveries after asset disposals, financing and wind-down costs.

NAV is just an estimate. Actual capital recovered and returned to shareholders is the modelled Base Case where assets take bullets – and the NAV doesn’t escape unscathed.

7. Pinned down by a £188m DCF problem

SEIT’s biggest near-term challenge is its £188m corporate RCF, with interest and administration costs accumulating while assets await disposal.

Like a MG42 Machine Gun pinning down the SEIT assets for now.

Three investments could provide substantial liquidity:

• Primary Energy: £172.3m Base recovery.
• Driva: £92.3m Base recovery.
• Oliva: £87.4m Base recovery.

As the graphic shows, Primary combined with either Driva or Oliva could extinguish the RCF. Driva and Oliva together would fall just £8.3m short.

All three could recover £352m, leaving £164m after RCF repayment, before remaining costs.

But timing matters. Oliva’s recovery includes operating cash through June 2028 and eventual disposal proceeds. The Oliva-first route is therefore illustrative rather than an assumed disposal timetable.

SEIT doesn’t necessarily need to sell all three to clear its borrowing. It needs sufficient proceeds, soon enough to stop the interest clock.

But that’s also the dilemma: Sell early to stop the financial bleeding, even if that involves some financial bleeding, or wait for a better price while the costs accumulate?

8. Should SEIT sell everything quickly?

No.

Nor should it simply retain every asset in pursuit of the highest possible theoretical NAV. The correct strategy is selective.

A reasonably priced early disposal can remove borrowing pressure and allow the other assets to be sold more patiently. Forcing RED or Onyx into a premature sale could destroy substantially more value than would be saved in holding-company interest.

The preferred approach remains:

Sell suitable mature assets first. Repay the RCF. Allow the more complicated investments enough time to demonstrate the value for which buyers will actually pay. Return surplus capital as soon as practicable.

Primary and Driva are logical early candidates, subject to achievable bids.

Oliva provides cash generation and an alternative source of disposal proceeds.

RED deserves time for its operational improvements, subject to refinancing discipline.

Onyx is the principal candidate for selective maturation — provided the additional value exceeds the capital, financing and execution risk required to achieve it.

The Odds & Sods should be realised opportunistically, with limited value-protecting expenditure rather than indiscriminate investment.

The object is not to maximise the last pound of aggregate proceeds while keeping shareholders waiting indefinitely.

It is to maximise the value of the cash returned, taking account of time.

9. Time — the missing dimension in NAV

There’s an enormous difference between receiving 71.2p in 2028 and receiving 71.2p in 2030.

The nominal recovery is identical. The XIRR annualised investment return isn’t.

Our Base estimates 71.2p of eventual shareholder recovery, but not when each distribution arrives.

Selling Primary, Driva or Oliva could reduce borrowing and bring distributions forward. Retaining RED or Onyx might generate additional value — but only if that improvement compensates shareholders for waiting.

That’s why the next disposal matters so much. It doesn’t just establish a valuation; it can change the timing of every subsequent shareholder return.

The objective isn’t to maximise the last penny recovered. It’s to maximise the time-value of the pennies shareholders actually receive.

10. The Detractor’s Flagellation

“DGI9! DGI9!” chants the Detractor. Trotting out the same, tired old line.

The Detractor can still hope for 26.1p. That would be more than a 20% write down from today’s share price and let’s not forget the Oak Bloke 25 for 25 is on the hook for 40p not 33p, remember.

The detractor can point to substantial write-downs, SEIT’s consumption of considerable capital and disappointed shareholders.

Buyers might demand bigger discounts than I’ve modelled. Refinancing could become expensive. Onyx might need more capital, while RED takes longer to mature.

And six different investments aren’t immune to a common enemy: a miserable market for infrastructure disposals.

4,096 possible combinations don’t make the favourable ones inevitable.

But the Detractor’s argument has a weakness.

Primary, Oliva, RED, Driva and Onyx aren’t imaginary businesses. They own operating infrastructure, with customers, contracts and cash-generating assets. My calculations suggest that even some decidedly unpleasant combinations could produce positive shareholder recoveries.

The Detractor’s strongest argument isn’t that everything is worthless. It’s that SEIT might fail to turn that value into cash before time, interest and costs devour too much of it.

And there’s only one way to settle that argument: Show us the money.

11. Conclusion — Earn This

Six investigations. Six very different investments. And 4,096 possible combinations of outcomes.

My Base Case suggests £772.5m, or 71.2p per share, after SEIT’s borrowing and estimated wind-down costs. Against a 33p share price that’s an attractive proposition.

SEIT doesn’t need all six investments to succeed.

Even five Severe Bears alongside an Onyx Bull produce a modelled recovery of approximately 44.5p/share. That’s not a guarantee, nor necessarily an attractive annualised return if shareholders must wait until 2030.

And the six investments aren’t completely independent. A difficult market for infrastructure disposals could hurt them all. The strategy therefore isn’t to sacrifice good assets cheaply in needless sacrifice in the hope that Onyx saves the day.

Realising assets intelligently, extinguishing the £188m RCF and give certain investments capable of earning a better return sufficient time to do so.

Price matters. Timing matters. But Cash returned matters most.

The Detractors can chant “DGI9” until they’re Pooh in the face.

SEIT’s next disposal will tell us considerably more than the next NAV announcement. Considerably more than a repeating chant.

Six articles have examined what SEIT’s investments might be worth. This seventh article attempted to illustrate how much can go wrong and the outcome is a net gain.

SEIT’s management have the task to turn those valuations into actual shareholder returns.

Regards

The Oak Bloke.

Disclaimers:

This content is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not consider your personal circumstances and is not financial, investment, tax, legal, or professional advice. Nothing here is a recommendation, offer, or solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any investment. Investing involves risk, including

The SEIT mini series Part 6 – An Onyx Day’s Work

Part 6 of the SEIT Series – the final asset – best till last?

The Oak Bloke

Oct 18, 2026

Dear reader,

In prior articles we’ve examined Primary Energy, Oliva, RED Rochester, SEIT’s Odds’n’Sods and Driva.

Onyx is SEIT’s largest and arguably most important holding – and it presents a different problem to the others. Maturing Onyx vs the more mature infrastructure of the other Top Five assets. With Onyx (and to a lesser extent RED and Driva) the challenge is to wait.

Because what if waiting for the business to mature actually creates substantially more value?

At March 2026, Onyx was valued at $367m (£278m). Yet only $128m of that valuation belonged to its five fully operational portfolios. The remaining $239m represented partly constructed portfolios and the development platform. That sounds risky. And it is.

But it also means a substantial amount of previously invested capital has yet to reach its full earning potential. My analysis suggests Onyx could potentially realise £435m or more by September 2030.

Let’s see why.

1. What exactly is Onyx?

Onyx develops, finances, owns and operates commercial and industrial (C&I) solar installations across the United States. Not to be confused with large utility-scale solar farms, as some Detractors have mistakenly done.

Customers purchase electricity under long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), avoiding the upfront construction costs. Approximately 93% of operating-portfolio revenue is contracted through PPAs, with an average contract duration of around 18 years and more than 100 offtakers.

So operating revenues should be reasonably predictable. The difficult part is getting the installations built.

SEIT initially acquired Onyx assets and 50% of its development business from Blackstone in February 2021 for approximately $150m, purchasing the remaining developer interest in June 2023.

Since then, SEIT has invested heavily. My reconstructed ledger suggests approximately £440m of gross capital deployed, £147m returned and £278m of remaining equity value at March 2026.

That’s an estimated historical XIRR of −1.5% annually. Not exactly spectacular.

2. Why is only 35% of the valuation fully operational?

At March 2026, Onyx carried an equity valuation of $367m. Only $128m — about 35% — related to the five fully operational portfolios.

The remaining c.$239m sat in three construction-stage portfolios and the development platform. That sounds risky. It is.

But “not fully operational” doesn’t mean “pure speculation”. Some of the construction-stage assets had already reached commercial operation, and progress accelerated sharply in 2025. Operational capacity increased from around 72MW in FY23 to 209MW by March 2026.

During calendar 2025, Onyx achieved 103MW reaching commercial operation, 93MW reaching mechanical completion, 57MW reaching notice to proceed and 50MW of new PPAs signed.

Turning capital already invested into profitable, cash-generating infrastructure is the Onyx thesis.

3. What about the $16.7m EBITDA?

Onyx’s five fully operational portfolios generated $16.7m EBITDA in calendar 2025, up 48.7% but 20% below budget.

Comparing that with Onyx’s $629m enterprise value gives an alarming 37.7× EBITDA.

But it’s a highly misleading comparison. The enterprise value includes all eight portfolios and the development platform, while the EBITDA excludes earnings from the three partly constructed portfolio groups.

Much of Onyx’s newly commissioned capacity has yet to contribute a full year’s earnings. The model assumes only a modest 3–5% improvement in mature-fleet efficiency, but the principal driver of future growth is increasing productive capacity.

4. The cash-recycling machine

In FY26, SEIT received £40.2m of capital returned from Onyx. But this wasn’t recurring free cash flow.

American solar projects combine sponsor equity, construction debt and tax-equity financing. As projects reach completion, tax-equity funding can release previously committed capital.

In June 2025, Onyx secured a $260m financing facility, potentially expandable to $350m, helping reduce its dependence on additional SEIT funding.

The FY27–FY29 model forecasts approximately £43m of equity cash generation, although this remains before further development expenditure, project-principal requirements and any additional restricted reserves.

Under my preferred long-hold strategy, Onyx retains that cash to complete projects, optimise financing and increase its eventual disposal value.

The crucial distinction: recycled capital isn’t profit, and cash already incorporated into Onyx’s eventual sale value cannot also be counted as a shareholder distribution.

That £43m must earn its keep before shareholders see the benefit.

The FY27–FY29 model illustrates the potential:

5. Three years of gestation — and potentially £435m

My model anticipates annualised EBITDA approaching £36–37m by March 2029, principally as recently commissioned projects mature and contribute full-year earnings.

But the real opportunity could lie in waiting longer.

The established Base assumes £318m of recovery in September 2028. An additional long-hold sensitivity suggests £435m by September 2030.

That extended valuation assumes Onyx’s £278m March 2026 equity value compounds at 9.6% annually over 4½ years, reaching approximately £420m. Add £38m of potential development optionality and apply a 5% disposal haircut: £435m.

That’s conditional, not guaranteed. At 7% annual growth, the same calculation produces just £394m.

Importantly, SEIT already removed approximately £45m of previously anticipated development value from Onyx’s March 2026 valuation. Any additional optionality must be earned through genuine progress, not simply reinstated.

The difference between the September 2028 Base and September 2030 extended-hold case is £117m, or an additional 10.8p per SEIT share.

But two additional years introduce financing costs, execution risk and the opportunity cost of delayed shareholder distributions.

The question isn’t whether Onyx could be worth £435m. It’s whether waiting until 2030 offers a better risk-adjusted return than accepting a credible offer in 2028.

These sterling valuations are also exposed to GBP/USD movements, particularly as SEIT reduces its currency hedging.

6. Other earlier sales matter

SEIT had £188m outstanding on its corporate RCF at September 2026. But Onyx would be my last choice of asset to sell merely to repay it.

Primary Energy is the more logical early disposal candidate. Its £172.3m Base recovery would almost extinguish the borrowing. Adding Driva’s £92.3m brings combined proceeds to £264.6m, leaving £76.6m after RCF repayment, before other costs.

There are alternatives. As the graphic shows, several combinations of earlier asset disposals could eliminate SEIT’s corporate debt without selling Onyx.

Under the revised lending arrangements, disposal proceeds must first reduce the corporate RCF. Only once that obligation and appropriate liquidity requirements are satisfied can surplus proceeds become available for shareholder returns.

The catch is timing. Oliva and the Odds ‘n’ Sods include future recoveries extending into 2028. Cash expected eventually isn’t necessarily cash available tomorrow.

Once the RCF is cleared, SEIT could allow Onyx to retain and recycle its internally generated cash, completing existing projects and improving its eventual disposal value.

Of course, SEIT is in a managed wind-down. Reinvestment must be justified by attractive incremental returns and consistent with its investment policy.

But why sacrifice an immature investment at a discount when other assets might provide the necessary liquidity?

Sell the mature assets. Clear the debt. Give Onyx the opportunity to mature — provided it earns that privilege.

7. Why would somebody buy Onyx?

A buyer would be acquiring three distinct sources of value: operating assets, maturing assets and a development platform.

A buyer is not simply purchasing today’s cash generation. They are underwriting the possibility that construction-stage value becomes established operating value, and that the platform proves capable of turning capital into repeatable equity returns.

The separate long-hold sensitivity suggests that this £278m could potentially become £435m by September 2030 — a possible £157m uplift.

Success depends on successful commissioning, sensible financing, disciplined reinvestment and a purchaser willing to pay for the resulting maturity.

The real question isn’t whether Onyx has value today. It’s whether enough of that latent value can be turned into dependable cash flow before someone else buys it.

8. What does the market tell us?

In June 2025, SEIT abandoned Onyx’s formal disposal process after receiving offers that failed to meet acceptable terms.

We know buyers existed. But we don’t know their prices or conditions, so we cannot claim the market validated Onyx’s valuation of £278m NAV.

But a useful C&I comparison is Drax’s July 2026 acquisition of Bluefield Solar Income Fund for 94.82p per share, including a permitted dividend, against March 2026 NAV of 104.52p.

That’s approximately 90.7% of NAV. Apply that discount mechanically to Onyx and you get £252m.

8a. Bluefield Solar BSIF

Bluefield was predominantly UK solar C&I infrastructure albeit with a different portfolio composition, regulatory regime and capital structure. Nevertheless the transaction demonstrates that an institutional buyer was prepared to acquire a substantial renewable portfolio (with development rights) at something reasonably close to its reported NAV.

8b. The Ecofin Detractor “Proof”

Ecofin US Renewables Infrastructure Trust as invested in by certain foolish detractors who claimed they had lost lots of their money at Ecofin and that that “proved” Onyx would also lose money provides a less relevant comparison to Onyx.

That disposal of predominantly utility solar, not C&I solar, occurred during a distressed wind-down and 62 solar installations totalling 63.68MWdc and PPAs of only 16 years, illustrates how project debt, working-capital adjustments and transaction expenses certainly can affect the amount actually recovered. Onyx needs a buyer willing to value its particular combination of operating projects, construction assets and development capabilities.

9. The.O.B.

10. The detractor’s flagellation

Onyx has consumed approximately £440m of SEIT capital, delivered a reconstructed historical XIRR of −1.5%, and missed its 2025 EBITDA budget by 20%. Its previous sale process failed to produce acceptable offers.

And now the Oak Bloke wants shareholders to wait another four years?

The Detractor has three rather uncomfortable questions for the OB:

First, does commissioning actually create value? A completed solar installation isn’t necessarily a profitable one. Construction overruns, weak PPAs and expensive financing can consume the anticipated returns.

Second, where’s the money coming from? The £43m cash-generation forecast isn’t unrestricted spending money. Debt repayments, development commitments and financing covenants may absorb much of it.

Third, why believe the £435m valuation? It assumes 9.6% annual equity-value growth and additional development optionality. At 7% growth, the outcome falls to £394m. And SEIT has already written approximately £45m off its previous development expectations.

The Detractor’s strongest argument is that shareholders have already spent enough money waiting for Onyx to fulfil its potential.

The counter to that is that SEIT has already spent £440m. That’s sunk capital. The defence must be that waiting generates a better risk-adjusted shareholder return than selling today.

11. Conclusion — don’t sell the sunshine too cheaply

Onyx’s opportunity is to convert construction-stage investments into mature, cash-generating infrastructure.

My £318m Base and separate £435m September 2030 long-hold sensitivity demonstrate the potential value of waiting, provided execution and reinvestment returns justify it.

Across all six SEIT investments, my Base Case suggests £772.5m (71.2p/share) of eventual shareholder recovery, after the RCF and central costs.

Earlier disposals could give Onyx time to mature without a forced sale. But the £440m already invested is sunk capital. A credible offer in 2028 must be weighed against the additional risks and potential rewards of waiting.

Don’t sell the sunshine too cheaply. But don’t wait forever for the clouds to clear.

Regards

The Oak Bloke

Always DYOR

The SNOWBALL has a comparator share VWRP where 100k was nominally invested on the same date of the SNOWBALL.

On the 02/06/2026 VWRP closed at £142.36 and the current price is £142.23

So in nearly 5 months you have added nothing, zilch to your pension pot.

Meanwhile the SNOWBALL during the same period has received income of £4,321, all from dividends.

Now £4,321 invested at the 8% currently available in the market, earns another £345 a year X the number of years you have to retirement. Also when the dividends are re-invested they will earn more income.

Remember the golden rule: If you can re-invest you dividends at 7% a year, you will double your income every ten years. The timescale will be shorter if you can take the risk to re-invest a higher rate.

The current income for the SNOWBALL for this calendar year will around 13k and the comparison income from VWRP using the 4% rule will be £6,824.00

Cash, Stash, Slash, Bash – how I see the current SEIT Enterprise Value to FY29

The Oak Bloke

Sep 03, 2026

Dear reader

Detractors in the chattersphere are debating what percentage discount SEIT might have to accept when selling its assets from the starting point of a 77.8p NAV.

Some slyly seek to draw parallels to DGI9. Let’s consider their slime later on.

First, the serious point is what discount to NAV. It’s my contention considering a discount to NAV starts the debate in the wrong place. Because what exactly is that 77.8p per share?

#1 How many times should you discount the same SEIT cash flow?

The £1.078bn portfolio valuation underlying that NAV is already based on discounted cash-flow valuations using a 9.5% weighted-average levered discount rate. SEIT itself says that this discount rate is a reasonable proxy for the return that could be generated by the portfolio over time, all else being equal.

In other words, these assets are not being marked at some theoretical future value. Their forecast future cash flows have already been dragged back to today’s money at a required return of roughly 9.5% a year. It is not an optimistic appraisal of what SEIT’s assets might someday be worth.

Then there is another layer.

During FY26 management materially reduced the cash flow assumptions embedded in those valuations:

1. Growth and development assumptions were cut. Those assumptions apply to SEIT and SEIT’s investment policy change of asset realisation. Those cuts were not based on a change in the market. More on that later.
2. Onyx lost around £45m of value after future development assumptions were reduced or removed.
3. RED-Rochester was marked down after the probability and timing of future customer demand were reduced.
4. Primary Energy took a hit from lower REC assumptions for Ohio, despite new RECs being applied for and an assumption that RECs cannot be sold outside Ohio.
5. Oliva was reduced by around £25m following more conservative regulatory assumptions.
6. Kyotherm had already been rebased to the agreed disposal economics. The sale was struck at c.9% below its September 2025 carrying value and was expected to reduce NAV by around 1.2p/share. The FY26 report says the valuation decline was consistent with that disposal discount.

So this wasn’t an optimistic cash-flow forecast then being discounted at 9.5%.

That 77.8p is based on an already a heavily stress-tested NAV. Management has historically revised assumptions both upwards and downwards when evidence justified it; by March 2026, however, several of the largest uncertain growth assumptions had been materially reduced, delayed or removed.

It has already been haircut, probability-weighted and is a capital-constrained forecast and then ADDITIONALLY is being discounted at 9.5%.

FY26 wasn’t the first time SEIT had had a haircut.

• In FY23, Primary Energy’s medium/long-term demand assumptions were materially reduced, costing about £16m of valuation. RED-Rochester also had £24m of adverse operating-cost assumption changes, although partly offset by commodity-price and growth effects.
• In 1H24, higher discount rates alone cut NAV by about £129m, while RED-Rochester forecasts were revised down and Onyx projects were delayed.
• In FY24, RED-Rochester underwent another detailed model review: revenue, load, business-development, labour, operating-cost and project-timing assumptions were revised, with adverse valuation impacts of roughly £26m, including about £17m from the September 2023 update.
• In FY25, SEIT again made asset-specific cash-flow adjustments at Oliva, Onyx, RED-Rochester and Primary Energy, and explicitly described its Onyx valuation as taking a “measured view” amid tariff/regulatory uncertainty.

So the FY26 reductions — Onyx development removed/reduced, Glencore probability slashed, Primary REC assumptions heavily cut, etc. — came on top of several years of prior rebasing.

Then, after arriving at the portfolio valuation, SEIT deducts the company’s own balance-sheet liabilities.

At 31 March 2026 the bridge was approximately:

£1.078bn portfolio valuation
− £233m RCF
− £2m working capital
+ £2m cash
= £845m NAV

or:

77.8p per share

Or:

79.2p NAV ESTIMATE per share today

Based on:

And even that may not be the end of the conservatism.

Because 9.5% is the levered portfolio discount rate.

SEIT also reports an 8.5% unlevered WADR, comprising approximately a 4.4% risk-free rate plus a 4.1% risk premium.

That distinction matters enormously now. SEIT is now deleveraging as quickly as possible.

The RCF has already fallen materially since 31st March, and the wind-down explicitly prioritises further debt reduction. As leverage disappears, why should a future buyer value an increasingly unlevered portfolio indefinitely using today’s 9.5% levered required return? Aggregate gearing has already fallen by about £70m since March 2026.

Using SEIT’s own 8.5% unlevered rate as a valuation anchor instead could increase the value of long-duration enterprise cash flows materially. Depending on their effective duration, our sensitivity analysis suggests something in the region of 7–12p per share could separate a 9.5% levered-style valuation from an 8.5% unlevered one.

That is not guaranteed upside. But it illustrates something important:

79.2p may already be a conservative valuation rather than an optimistic one.

And then we arrive at the market cap.

The shares trades at 36p.

So investors aren’t merely applying a discount to the future cash flows.

Those future cash flows have already been discounted at roughly 9.5%, after material operational and development assumptions have already been reduced, and after £233m of RCF debt has already been deducted.

Then the stock market cuts the resulting equity value by more than half again.

That is the second enormous layer of pessimism.

The debate therefore shouldn’t simply be:

“What discount to the 79.2p NAV estimate will buyers demand?”

It should also be:

“How much pessimism is already embedded in that estimated 79.2p NAV before the market applies another enormous discount on top?”

Or even:

“Should the pessimism discussion not be based on the equity value implied by an unlevered valuation framework? Perhaps ~86p-91p on an 8.5% unlevered valuation sensitivity?”

Or even:

“What if a buyer values SEIT’s increasingly unlevered enterprise cash flows closer to sector infrastructure hurdle rates?”

SEIT itself uses an 8.5% unlevered WADR. That does not look aggressive against peers: NESF uses an 8.0% weighted-average portfolio discount rate.

An 8.0% valuation sensitivity is not my base case, but nor is it an absurd one.

On my sensitivity analysis, something around 8.0% could imply an equity value in the region of ~95p per share — without reinstating all the development optionality SEIT has already removed.

Why is Arqiva, a TV/Radio infrastructure broadcaster and water meter provider a relevant read across for SEIT? Why are other energy infrastructure trusts not infinitely more relevant? To use DGI9 is a nonsense. Just amateur slime from Clowns.

#2 CASH

Let’s consider the FY26 results discussed in “Play it again Sam” and the potential upsides and downsides to cashflow.

Because assuming zero further disposals the portfolio continues to generate cash.

So my base case progression of EBITDA for FY26→FY29 is:

£72m → £80m → £89m → £96m

It could be higher or lower so there’s a Bear and Bull scenario too.

All three models are considered in run-off capacity scenarios. They are not realisation forecasts. If an asset is sold/disposed in the next three years, its operating cash disappears from the model and is replaced by disposal proceeds.

#2a: BASE CASE

Projects SEIT has already funded and built start doing what they were supposed to do, while cash extraction improves. The base case does not require the old blue-sky assumptions to come back. There are no great assumptions around inflation although SEIT would be a beneficiary to inflation given its inflation-linked revenues.

• Onyx: is the key swing factor. Existing operational projects totalled 209MW (at 31/12/25) under construction progressively enter operation and the operational MW base rises materially; no new development pipeline is assumed – just activation of existing projects +597 MW (the near tripling).
• RED-Rochester: underlying customer demand and efficiency projects support modest growth; Reju begins to contribute, but Glencore is still treated cautiously and no full recovery of previously removed upside is assumed.
• Primary Energy: core contracted operations continue to perform around budget; modest project/efficiency gains offset conservative REC assumptions.
• Oliva: second-half FY26 improvement proves durable; generation and electricity-market participation recover enough to lift EBITDA from depressed levels.
• Driva: remains a steady compounder; existing contracts and energy-as-a-service activity produce modest growth and good cash conversion.
• Portfolio-wide: lower capex/reinvestment requirements during wind-down allow more cash to be upstreamed rather than recycled.
• Holdco: RCF falls steadily, reducing finance costs and creating a positive feedback loop into net cash generation.

• Moderate EBITDA growth: £80m → £89m → £96m
• Cash conversion improves as reinvestment reduces: 72.5% → 77.5% → 81.3%
• Cash upstreamed: £58m → £69m → £78m
• Holdco costs fall with deleveraging: £24m → £19m → £14m
• Net cash: £34m → £50m → £64m
• Assumes Onyx commissioning, better Oliva contribution and normal operational progress, without restoring all written-down growth assumptions

#2b: The Bear Case:

Nothing really breaks, but very little improves.

• Onyx: commissioning slips again; only modest additional capacity becomes fully operational; EBITDA stays around current run-rate rather than stepping up materially.
• RED-Rochester: existing customers remain stable, but Glencore/Li-Cycle growth does not arrive and Reju contributes little or later than hoped.
• Primary Energy: core operations remain dependable, but REC economics stay weak and no meaningful upside is restored from the assumptions already cut from NAV.
• Oliva: generation/market economics remain subdued; no strong recovery in profitability and regulatory headwinds persist.
• Driva: continues to perform reasonably but does not repeat the strong outperformance seen against budget; growth contracts add little near-term cash.
• Portfolio-wide: cash remains trapped at project level for debt service, maintenance and working capital; cash conversion improves only slightly.
• Holdco: RCF repayment is slow, so interest remains a significant drag through FY29.

• EBITDA broadly flat: £72m → £74m → £76m
• Cash conversion stays weak: 60% → 62% → 64%
• Cash upstreamed: £43.2m → £45.9m → £48.6m
• Holdco interest/fees/costs fall only slowly: £25m → £23m → £21m
• Net cash: £18.2m → £22.9m → £27.6m
• Assumes little benefit from Onyx ramp-up or better asset-level cash extraction

#2c. THE BULL CASE

The existing portfolio ramps strongly and some of the haircuts are reversed.

• Onyx: strong execution. A large portion of the existing construction portfolio reaches full operation on schedule, materially lifting EBITDA and upstream cash.
• RED-Rochester: Reju ramps well, efficiency projects deliver, and at least some customer-growth assumptions previously heavily probability-weighted begin to crystallise.
• Primary Energy: core operations beat budget and either REC pricing or incremental projects contribute more than currently embedded in the conservative case.
• Oliva: meaningful operational recovery; stronger generation, electricity prices and regulatory outcomes restore part of the earnings power lost in recent years.
• Driva: continues outperforming budget and wins additional profitable energy-service contracts without consuming excessive capital.
• Portfolio-wide: wind-down materially changes behaviour — maintenance capex only, very high cash extraction, limited cash trapped in subsidiaries.
• Holdco: asset cash and disposals crush the RCF quickly; interest expense falls sharply, allowing an increasing proportion of EBITDA to reach shareholders.

• Stronger EBITDA growth: £86m → £101m → £112m
• High cash conversion: 78% → 82% → 85%
• Cash upstreamed: £67.1m → £82.8m → £95.2m
• Rapid RCF reduction cuts Holdco costs sharply: £22m → £15m → £9m
• Net cash: £45.1m → £67.8m → £86.2m
• Assumes strong Onyx ramp-up, good execution across the remaining portfolio and increasingly efficient cash extraction during wind-down

#3 Double Counting

Eagle-eyed readers will say ah hah, a discounted future value includes the value of cash over the next three years.

Whether the start point is 79p – 95p per share we can’t just add 5.8p – 18.4p depending on whether the bear, base or bull scenario occurs.

But we can consider the EV. It was £1547.4m at 31/3/26 and is an estimated £1,415m as at 30/8/26

It is reasonable to think debt will be amortised at each project, or further debt incurred in a bear case reducing the value to SEIT. The assumptions made to the EV over the three years to FY29 are:

The base case is a run off would pay the RCF by FY29, although the bear case would reduce the RCF but not eliminate over three years. Even so even the bear case suggests the NAV nudges up by 1p over three years.

Under the base case the underlying portfolio EV only rises by £124m. But shareholder equity rises by around: £372m because shareholders benefit from both EV growth and deleveraging.

That difference is not financial alchemy: it is the combined effect of £124m of EV growth, project-level debt amortisation and cash generation used to eliminate Holdco leverage.

SEIT is a leveraged equity claim on roughly £1.4bn of retained enterprise value. Therefore relatively modest changes in enterprise value, combined with operating cash flow and debt amortisation, can create disproportionately large changes in equity NAV.

To illustrate this the Bull case assumes an average 7% per annum growth in EV and this is heavily weighted towards success at Onyx both due to its relative size but also due to upside.

I repeat once again these are run-off valuation scenarios assuming the retained portfolio remains owned for three years to FY29. Earlier disposals would replace the relevant future EV, debt amortisation and operating cash flows with the actual disposal proceeds received. The scenarios therefore illustrate value-generation capacity, not a forecast of the precise liquidation sequence.

#4 Disposals

SEIT has written down the development potential of Onyx to zero. It has likely curtailed its ambitions at other holdings such as Driva too. That doesn’t mean a buyer would value that expansion capability at zero. The market is valuing that at zero because SEIT is valuing it at zero.

SEIT proved the expansion model – but then changed its investment objective or rather its shareholders did – in the wind-down vote.

Will an asset be sold at X percent discount or Y percent? I’m not going to debate the specifics of what percent I think. I’ve given plenty of examples where assets are being sold at 16X – 18X EV/EBITDA

That valuation approach suggests my estimates of EV and EBITDA are broadly plausible.

I come back to the common sense view that cash-generating assets get valued on the basis of their ability to deliver a stream of returns. Even if SEIT-ies have to wait, the assets themselves can generate cash, amortise debt and potentially grow their ex-distribution enterprise value while they wait for realisations.

The model implies a buyer being willing to pay a near zero discount to NAV would be plausible under a Bear case based on a FY29 forecast. Or pay a 33p premium due to anticipating a rising valuation of some 33p under the base case, or even more under the Bull case is plausible.

So discount? What do you mean discount?

Conclusion

The market price of roughly 36p appears to assume that a great deal still has to go wrong. That assumption comes after SEIT has already:

• reduced growth assumptions;
• probability-weighted uncertain revenues;
• constrained development because of its own capital position;
• marked Kyotherm to actual disposal economics of -9%;
• applied a 9.5% levered discount rate;
• deducted substantial Holdco debt.

The assets do not simply sit there while shareholders wait. They generate cash. Project debt amortises. The RCF falls. Financing costs decline. And projects already funded can move from construction into operation.

That is why I think the question “what discount to NAV will SEIT sell at?” is far too simplistic. NAV itself is a moving target.

Under my Bear case, significant operating disappointment is largely offset by cash generation and deleveraging. The NAV broadly stands still even after three more years filled with never-ending disappointment.

Under the Base case, relatively modest enterprise-value growth combined with debt reduction could lift the equity value materially.

And under the Bull case, successful execution at Onyx and the other principal holdings creates substantial upside without requiring me to restore every development assumption SEIT has already removed.

Perhaps the slime have the right of it and SEIT will be just like DGI9 and today’s article picture of a burning effigy truly foreshadows SEIT’s coming future.

But before accepting that metaphor, I would ask one rather inconvenient question:

Are we looking at the same assets, the same cash flows and the same balance sheet?

I don’t think we are.

At 36p a share, I think the market is effectively discounting SEIT’s cash flows twice.

Regards

The Oak Bloke.

Thursday 22 October

Aberdeen Asian Income Fund Ltd ex-dividend date
Bankers Investment TrustPLC ex-dividend date
Foresight Solar Fund Ltd ex-dividend date
TwentyFour Income Fund Ltd ex-dividend date

HENDERSON FAR EAST INCOME LIMITED

4^th interim dividend for the year ending 31 August 2026

The directors have declared the fourth interim dividend of 6.30p per ordinary share in respect of the year ending 31 August 2026. The dividend will be paid on 27 November 2026 to shareholders on the register on 30 October 2026 (the record date). The shares will be quoted ex-dividend on 29 October 2026. 

This brings the total dividend in respect of the year ended 31 August 2026 to 25.10p per ordinary share.

Reinvesting dividends is one of the most important principles in investing, which helps to compound investment returns. Compounding is a type of ‘multiplying effect’ created by using dividend income to purchase new shares, which in turn grows future dividend income, creating a powerful feedback loop.

AJ Bell

Sequoia Economic Infrastructure Income Fund Limited  

Dividend Declaration

Interim Dividend for the Period Ended 30 September 2026

The Directors of the Company have declared that an interim dividend of 1.71875p per share will be payable to holders of Ordinary Shares as follows in respect of the three-month period ended 30 September 2026:

Ex-Dividend Date:	29 October 2026
Record Date:	30 October 2026
Payment Date:	27 November 2026
Dividend per Ordinary Share:	1.71875 pence per share

Brett Owens, Chief Investment Strategist
Updated: October 14, 2026

Yeah, we’re here for the dividends. But isn’t it nice when we buy a stock and it goes up, like, right away?

And it happens for us. We are contrarians! We buy payers when they are out of favor because that maximizes our yield (more dividends per dollar!) and minimizes our downside (everyone has already sold!).

Sometimes this works and we buy, say, a 6% dividend stock that quickly gains 10%. The hated setup gave us a quick paper buck. Cool—but now what do we do?

Well, we need to understand that a dividend acts like an anchor in both directions. This stock attracted income investors because it used to pay, say, 5%, but its price dropped, that yield became 6%, and people started buying because, “hey, Great Stock pays us more!”

But then, a 10% rise can move its yield closer to that previous 5% mark. So, our “next move” depends upon our timeframe and return goals. If we are here truly just for the divvie, then we hold. We locked in a 6% yield when we bought, which means this price movement is just noise. (True, potentially loud noise, but clamor to be ignored nonetheless.)

That said, we have to be OK with our gains retracing. And maybe we’re not. Perhaps we don’t mind having a shorter timeframe to lock in that 10%. Or even 17%, in an example I’ll show you now. This was a stock I recommended back in March. Since then, in aggregate, it’s gone absolutely nowhere. But we made 20% off of it anyway!

The landlord I’m talking about was Broadstone Net Lease (BNL), which I recommended to my Dividend Swing Trader readers earlier this year.

Most investors, even income-focused ones, don’t know the name because BNL rarely makes financial headlines. It quietly operates in the background with hundreds of single-tenant properties. These are mostly industrial buildings and a little bit of retail. BNL leases them out on long-term contracts and in net lease format, which means the tenants cover the property taxes, insurance and upkeep.

What does BNL do? It collects the rent and pays out most of it to shareholders in the form of dividends. Not a bad business.

We bought it low because BNL had been undervalued for some time. The company went public in late 2020, just in time for the Federal Reserve’s 2022 rate hikes. Not great for landlords like BNL who borrow money to grow, and therefore compete with the bond market for income investors. When rates jumped in 2022, investors dumped the whole REIT group, good landlords and bad. BNL slid from $26 to $14. By March of this year, it had clawed back to around $19, which I still considered cheap.

We bought, because BNL’s operating numbers told a steadier story. Occupancy was above 99%, about as good as it gets (duh!). AFFO, an earnings measure that accounts for non-cash items, grew 4% in 2025. Management had just raised its quarterly dividend again to 29.25 cents. Plus, the current leases had plenty of room to run, an average of 9.6 years, and they included built-in rent increases of about 2.1% per year.

BNL is growing cash flow by building new properties for current and future tenants, such as Amazon, Sprouts Farmers Market and Academy Sports. These companies have all signed long-term leases with BNL before construction.

We bought a little above $19 for a yield of 6%, and then the shares began to reward us. Over the next four months, BNL climbed to $22.79 per share, and along the way it paid two quarterly dividends totaling 58.5 cents per share, rewarding us with about 3% on our purchase price.

I told DST readers that Wall Street had caught on, and we sold for a 20.7% total return in about four months. Here’s what that looked like:

(Note: The chart above is price only. Our trade generated a $3.43 price gain plus $0.585 in dividends, a 20.7% total return.)

You see that most of our return came from price growth and not the dividend. And that is my point!

Last week, BNL traded at $18.28, below where we bought it in March. If you bought it then and held on, you’re down about 1%, even after collecting three dividends. At DST we banked 20.7%.

Why? Because the stock rallied to the upper end of its likely trading range. My DST system flashed a “take profits!” signal, so that’s what we did. There was no need to grit our teeth and endure a pullback. We took the money and ran!

In Dividend Swing Trader, we look for shorter term total-return opportunities in the same types of dividend-paying stocks and funds that you and I know and love. In these situations, we’re looking to collect our payouts and pursue price gains in the months ahead. That’s why I begged my editors to launch DST.

BNL shows what we’re looking for: a dividend worth collecting and enough price upside to make a shorter holding period worthwhile.

Now (as Tax-Loss Selling Starts Early)

Brett Owens, Chief Investment Strategist
Updated: October 13, 2026

This year, Christmas (for dividend investors!) is set to arrive two months early.

Our gift?

A chance to grab our favorite high yielders—closed-end funds (CEFs) paying 10% and more—on an early “year-end” sale.

How cheap are we talking here? How about 90 cents on the dollar? In some cases less.

We’ve got an early start to the year-end tax-loss selling season to thank for this opportunity.

Forget Year-End: The Best Dividend Deals Are Right Now

Our play starts with the fact that CEFs are a small market, with only around 365 out there. That means they’re mainly held by individual investors, since most CEFs aren’t big enough to move the needle for the big guys.

And when I say these funds are mainly held by everyday folks, I mean it. Individuals make up around 90% of CEF owners, according to one source.

You and I both know the mainstream crowd is highly likely to overreact to the headlines. That’s our “in,” because I expect these folks to get a little uncomfortable in the weeks ahead. As they do, they’ll sell—and we’ll be there to scoop up the bargains!

Here’s what I see driving that selling pressure:

• Midterms are coming, cranking up the anxiety level with each passing day.
• October is historically the most volatile month for stocks.
• Soaring bond yields are scaring investors into selling anything that looks like a bond (hint!).

This is already happening: According to the Q3 CEF review from First Trust, the average CEF discount to net asset value (NAV, or the value of its underlying portfolio) widened to 8.4% at the end of Q3 from 6% at the end of June.

Taxable-bond CEFs (hint! hint!) saw their discounts widen further, from 6.6% to 9.98%.

That’s where those early tax-loss sales come in, because despite all the worry these days, the go-to stock ETF, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPY), has gained 15% this year.

That’s going to prompt some nervous folks to take money off the table. As they do, they’ll offset those gains by booking losses. Bond CEFs, which have taken a beating, are prime candidates to be tossed over the side.

The result? Those already wide 9.98% average discounts could get even bigger, pushing these funds’ yields higher still.

Here’s the twist: When these folks clear the IRS’s “wash-sale rule” (which disallows the loss if you buy the same fund within 30 days before or after you sell it), they’ll likely re-buy those same high-yielding bond CEFs.

It’ll pay to be in before that happens. Then you could either sell later this year or early next, when a nice gain may be on the table—or simply hang on for the income.

Here are two CEFs to target, each kicking out dividends near 11%.

(Early) Tax-Loss Bargain #1: A 10.8%-Payer With a 10% “Red Tag Deal”

The BlackRock Credit Allocation Income Trust (BTZ) delivers a nice blend of stability and value, with 45% of the portfolio in investment-grade bonds. The rest is split among high-yield corporates, foreign debt, agency mortgages and bank loans.

The fund’s “goldilocks” effective duration (4.87 years) is another plus. It positions BTZ to gain if rates fall, while limiting losses if rates go higher than expected.

Which brings us to leverage—a tool many CEFs use. Here, management has taken a pragmatic approach, borrowing against 27% of the portfolio. That, like BTZ’s duration, is modest enough to boost income without layering on too much risk if rates keep rising.

The yield? 10.8%, and that payout has held up well over the last decade, with a small cut in 2017 more than offset by a hike in 2019. It’s been “no drama” since.

Source: Income Calendar

The discount plays a role in the payout: If you divide the yearly dividend by the fund’s NAV, not its 10%-discounted market price, you get 9.7%. That’s what management needs to earn to cover the dividend, and while NAV is down slightly this year as rates have climbed, its total NAV return was 10.1% in 2025.

But this year’s NAV weakness looks more than priced in: Right now, BTZ’s 10% markdown is much wider than its five-year average of 6.6% and double the 5% at which the fund traded at the start of the year.

That makes this one a smart play on “early” tax-loss selling. If the discount narrows later this year or early next, we’ll have a nice return to take off the table. And if rates fall, NAV returns would likely rise. That would bolster dividend coverage—and could shift BTZ from a short-term discount play to something more.

 (Early) Tax-Loss Bargain #2: A 10.9% Payer With a “Blown Out” Discount

The PGIM High Yield Bond Fund (ISD) provides the clearest evidence yet that our tax-loss selling party is kicking off early. This 10.9%-payer (complete with a monthly dividend) trades at an 11.5% discount.

Compare that to the average over the last year (just 2.2%!).

One chart clearly shows us that this deal is all about investors panic-selling ISD in their rush away from bonds:

ISD’s Portfolio Is Fine. Its Market Price Has Tanked

Above we see that the fund’s total return NAV (or its portfolio performance) has been flat, while its return on the public markets (in orange) has plunged. Investors are dumping a portfolio that’s doing just fine!

The result is an 11.5% discount that’s done nothing but grow wider over the last few months, again suggesting the crowd is looking to book its losses here.

ISD’s Discount Widens Heading Into Late 2026

The fund’s portfolio also complements BTZ, with 90% rated BB or below. That focus on non-investment-grade paper is great for us, because it’s where the biggest yields are.

We’ve got history on our side, too. Since its launch in 2012, ISD has posted a 102% return on its market price, even with this pullback. Compare that to around 84% for the State Street SPDR Bloomberg High-Yield Bond ETF (JNK), a proxy for US high-yield bonds.

And on a NAV basis (a better measure of management’s skill), it’s done better. See the purple line below:

ISD’s Portfolio Crushes Its Benchmark

ISD also uses zero leverage. Plus, its effective duration is 3.85 years, again positioning it to benefit from falling rates but not suffer too much if rates head higher.

My take? Tax losses or no, investors are moving off this well-run fund at exactly the wrong time. Taking the other side of that argument—and that sweet 10.9% dividend—is the better play.

My #1 “Christmas in October” Buy: 12% Dividends. 94 Cents on the Dollar

And there are even bigger dividends than these two on sale now.

Like my favorite bond CEF. Check out its resume:

• It yields 12%, paid monthly.
• It usually trades at a premium to NAV. Today you can buy it for 94 cents on the dollar.
• It’s run by a legendary CEF firm—a company I call “the Amazon of CEFs.”
• Its manager is a former Morningstar Fixed Income Manager of the Year.

Yet investors are blindly tossing this smartly run income play in their rush away from bonds. That’s our cue to buy, before the tax-loss selling crowd finishes selling and starts buying back in.