Cavendish – Renewables: Strong year poised to continue

From a Cavendish equity research note on listed renewable infrastructure and energy funds.

Key points from the published summary are:

• Cavendish says 2026 has been a much improved year for the renewables sector, helped by higher power prices and several other positive developments.research-tree
• The note previews upcoming third-quarter NAV (Net Asset Value) reports and expects a strong reporting period, largely because of favourable power-price forward curves, although higher discount rates could offset some of the benefit.research-tree
• It also discusses the potential impact of a potentially very strong El Niño weather pattern, which Cavendish believes could be beneficial for some wind power projects.research-tree
• The research covers renewable infrastructure investment companies including Foresight Environmental Infrastructure, Foresight Solar Fund, Greencoat Renewables, Greencoat UK Wind, NextEnergy Solar Fund, Octopus Renewables Infrastructure Trust, and The Renewables Infrastructure Group (TRIG).research-tree

In plain English, the headline“Strong year poised to continue” means Cavendish is maintaining a generally positive outlook and believes the favourable conditions that have supported renewable infrastructure valuations and earnings this year are likely to persist into the next reporting period.research-tree

Specifically as an investor for TRIG, UKW, NESF, ORIT, GRP, FSFL, or FGEN .

Sources Research Tree

For an income-focused UK investor, the most important question is not whether renewable infrastructure funds are “cheap”, but whether the combination of yield + NAV recovery + narrowing discounts can deliver attractive total returns from here.

Based on the Cavendish view that conditions remain supportive for the sector, here’s how I’d look at the main trusts mentioned. The note specifically highlights a stronger year driven by power-price developments and anticipated strength in upcoming NAV reports.research-tree

The Renewables Infrastructure Group (TRIG)

Investment case

• Broadly diversified across wind, solar and storage.
• One of the largest and most liquid renewable infrastructure trusts.
• If sentiment towards the sector improves, TRIG is often among the first vehicles institutions buy.

Main opportunity

• Potential discount narrowing alongside a high dividend yield.
• Exposure across several technologies reduces single-asset risk.

Main risk

• Higher discount rates can pressure NAVs even when operational performance is good.

View

• Probably the best “core holding” in the sector for a patient income investor.

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Greencoat UK Wind (UKW)

Investment case

• Pure-play UK wind exposure.
• Often regarded as one of the higher-quality names in the space.

Main opportunity

• If wind generation and power-price assumptions remain supportive, earnings can surprise positively.
• Institutional investors tend to favour established wind portfolios.

Main risk

• Greater dependence on wind resource conditions than diversified peers.

View

• One of the higher-conviction recovery candidates if sentiment towards renewables continues improving.

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Greencoat Renewables (GRP)

Investment case

• Irish-focused renewable generation portfolio.

Main opportunity

• Geographic diversification away from the UK.
• Potential beneficiary of improving sentiment across European renewables.

Main risk

• Smaller market profile than some London-listed peers.

My view

• Interesting diversifier, although UK investors often gravitate first to UKW and TRIG.

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NextEnergy Solar Fund (NESF)

Investment case

• Primarily solar assets.
• Historically has offered a very attractive dividend yield.

Main opportunity

• Solar valuations have been under pressure; recovery could be powerful if rates stabilise.
• Significant discount-to-NAV opportunities have existed across the solar-focused trusts.

Main risk

• Solar generation is naturally more seasonal and power-price sensitive.

My view

• One of the more interesting value opportunities for investors willing to accept a little more volatility.

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Foresight Solar Fund (FSFL)

Investment case

• Large solar portfolio with experienced management.

Main opportunity

• Similar discount-narrowing potential to NESF.
• Long operational history.

Main risk

• Like all solar funds, valuation sensitivity to long-term power assumptions.

My view

• A solid income vehicle, though I slightly prefer NESF for value at many points in the cycle.

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Octopus Renewables Infrastructure Trust (ORIT)

Investment case

• More diverse renewable exposure, including different technologies and jurisdictions.

Main opportunity

• Discount could narrow significantly if investor confidence returns.
• Backed by a well-known renewable investment manager.

Main risk

• Less liquidity than some larger peers.

My view

• Potentially one of the better discount-recovery stories if sector sentiment strengthens.

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If I were building a £100,000 renewable income portfolio today

The framework would be:

• 35% TRIG
• 30% UKW
• 20% NESF
• 15% ORIT

That gives:

• Core diversified exposure (TRIG)
• Wind exposure (UKW)
• Solar value opportunity (NESF)
• Discount-recovery kicker (ORIT)

For an interest in income-producing investment trusts and renewable assets, I’d currently view TRIG + UKW as the strongest “sleep well at night” combination, with NESF offering perhaps the greatest upside if discounts across the sector continue to close. The Cavendish note’s constructive stance would support that thesis, assuming the stronger operating backdrop persists

CO PILOT

GREENCOAT UK WIND PLC

(the “Company”)

Net Asset Value and Dividend Announcement

Net Asset Value / Net Asset Value per share	£2,929 million / 135.7 pence
Dividend / Dividend per share	£57.6 million / 2.67 pence

The Company announces that its unaudited Net Asset Value as of 30 September 2026 is £2,929 million (135.7 pence per share).

The Company’s September 2026 Factsheet is available on the Company’s website, www.greencoat-ukwind.com.

The Company also announces a quarterly interim dividend of 2.67 pence per share with respect to the quarter ended 30 September 2026.

Dividend Timetable

Ex-dividend date 12 November 2026

Record date  13 November 2026

Payment date  27 November 2026

AGNC Investment Corp. Declares Monthly Common Stock Dividend of $0.12 per Common Share for October 2026

07/10/2026 9:01pm

PR Newswire (US)

AGNC Investment (NASDAQ:AGNC)
Historical Stock Chart

From Sep 2026 to Oct 2026

BETHESDA, Md., Oct. 7, 2026 /PRNewswire/ — AGNC Investment Corp. (Nasdaq: AGNC) announced today that its Board of Directors has declared a cash dividend of $0.12 per share of common stock for October 2026. The dividend is payable on November 10, 2026 to common stockholders of record as of October 30, 2026.

When markets open across the pond, I am going to buy a further 2k of AGNC bringing the total invested to 5k.

The next 5k of dividends for investing will be in a higher yielder but lower risk share.

I’ve re-invested the paper profits in UKW into PCT.

33 shares for £200 plus a dealing charge of £10.00.

The plan is to build a long term holding and then sell all the shares at a profit and re-invest in higher yielding share and do it all over again.

Currently £600 invested.

All deals are charge at five pounds for sells and ten pounds for buys.

You should be able to deal at a better rate.

I’ve sold 1016 shares in UKW for £1,202,00, a paper profit of £202 plus a couple of earned dividends.

If you buy at the wrong time (120.4329p) but do nothing as long as the dividends are paid, remembering the rules.

Then by re-investing the earned dividends back into your portfolio, you should, in time print a profit and also earn more dividends from the dividends re-invested.

I may reduce the holding back to 10k by selling the last purchase for a paper profit although you can’t actually choose which shares to sell.

Possibly the best risk-adjusted yield in UK equities

After calling the bottom of a three-year downtrend, analyst Edmond Jackson’s share tip has returned 20% in seven months. Here’s what he’d do with them now.

16th October 2026

by Edmond Jackson from interactive investor

Yesterday, I attended a Capital Markets event for Greencoat UK Wind

UKW

for the £2.5 billion renewable infrastructure investment trust that is a leader in wind farms. 

The purpose was to elucidate how this UK-listed company will apply its strong cash flow in support of durable long-term returns, having generated £1.1 billion since flotation in 2013. A similar amount of self-generated capital is anticipated over the next five years alone.

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Care is needed with well-choreographed City presentations. In a twist on the late comedian Eric Morecambe’s quip in the Grieg piano concerto sketch, “They’re playing all the right notes and in precisely the right order.”

Even so, it bolstered my sense of how applying a “buy” stance at 96p in March (Stockwatch: why I like these two renewable infrastructure funds), when pricing offered an 11.2% yield with cover over 1.2x, was spot-on, and this share offers a good chance of continuing to evolve a bullish “bowl” chart having declined from around 190p in 2022:

Source: TradingView. Past performance is not a guide to future performance.

Last August, I wobbled – albeit maintaining “buy” – having realised the extent of subsidies not apparent from the accounts. However, that also was with the Reform Party riding high, which supposedly would cut net-zero spending. Interestingly, its waning in the polls has coincided with an uptrend in renewables shares but is not the whole story.

When I alighted on renewables last April, it was in a classic sense of mean-reversion due. Shares looked to have fallen too far amid disillusioned selling, and a market value 0.72x net asset value (NAV) also implied probability of upside. Yesterday’s event was an enabler to appreciate why a current 9.6% yield at 115p is less risky than it seems.

Organic investment and broad tailwinds

Political risk cannot be eliminated, and wind remains prone to weather variations, yet to me the dominating tailwind is electrification. Adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), also the steady migration away from gas and oil for heating, positions a wind operator well in the long run, and in the short term it benefits from high energy prices because of global conflicts.

Reinvestment is vital to sustain shareholder returns but management also sees this as logical for growth rather than, say, prioritising acquisitions.

Yesterday substantiated two key themes: “life-extension” to the assets and “repowering”, which involves upgrading older turbines with far more efficient and powerful models. Both strategic initiatives should benefit NAV while also de-risking yield.

A £100 million boost to cash flow by 2030 was entertained from life-extensions alone. At questions, I elicited a 15% accretion to NAV with regard to the Willow wind farm being showcased and, yes, this was said to be representative of the group portfolio.

Cash flow is to be approximately equally applied for new construction, life extension and repowering. The 30 June interim cash flow statement showed a 22% rise in net cash generated from operations to £244 million with zilch investment then, applied as £114 million on dividends, £47 million finance costs and £30 million on repaying loans.

The right strategy in an overall financial context?

While the presentation focused on actions, we should consider how Greencoat had £1,621 million net debt as of 30 June, its finance costs swiping 27% of operating profit. Net gearing was 56% and in terms of credit risk measures, “moderate risk” requires caution be taken.

Against this, the last six years’ financial record initially seems bumpy, although the oddity of £45.4 million negative revenue last year relates to a £446 million “movement in fair value of assets” under IFRS 13, taken above the line. Otherwise, investment income had been dead-stable at £395 million.

Management embarking on this organic investment programme can therefore seem potentially tight given that financing aspects (dividends, modest buybacks, interest paid and loan repayments) took 79% of first-half net cash flow. Bear in mind, any extended period of low winds might compromise this investment and/or dividends without further recourse to debt. End-June cash was £69 million.

Yesterday also brought news of the acquisition of a remaining 20% stake in a portfolio of UK wind farms for £10.5 million, funded from net cash generation. This being incremental, related to the existing portfolio, rather than any radical acquisitive move. Speaking with management elicited the standard “we look at all opportunities”, but in a debt and dividends context I cannot envisage acquisitions being a plank of corporate development.

Until we see financial proof from this programme it is hard to quantify what extent of growth it can add to shareholder returns, besides enhancing security. When I promptly cross-checked the claim as to 15% NAV accretion via Google AI, for what that is worth it suggested 5% would be an industry norm.  

Strong management is a definite advantage

Perhaps they can outperform anyway. Amid informal discussion with renewables analysts and institutional investors, I found consensus in how Greencoat is regarded as the strongest in the sector. The presentation had concluded with a board-type discussion, including the non-executive directors, with Steve Packwood, one of UK Wind’s key managers with Matt Ridley, describing it to me as “certainly keeping us on our toes”.

I got a sense of how, if this operation was an industrial plc – which effectively it is – rather than badged as an infrastructure fund, its share rating would be better.

The last director dealings were in May and June at around 101.5p when the chair of three years bought £50,800 worth and a non-executive director of seven years bought £30,500 worth, hence meaningful rather than token purchases.

Greencoat UK Wind – financial summary
Year-end 30 Dec

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Turnover (£m)	155	423	1,025	234	61.7	-45.4
Operating margin (%)	81.3	93.0	96.2	82.8	38.3	0.0
Operating profit (£m)	126	394	987	194	23.6	-74.3
Net profit (£m)	104	363	954	126	-55.4	-193
Reported earnings/share (p)	6.5	18.3	41.2	5.4	-2.4	-8.7
Normalised earnings/share (p)	6.5	18.3	41.2	5.4	-2.4	-8.7
Operating cashflow/share (p)	7.7	12.2	23.6	15.5	17.1	16.5
Capital expenditure/share (p)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Free cashflow/share (p)	7.7	12.2	23.6	15.5	17.1	16.5
Dividend/share (p)	7.1	7.2	7.7	10.0	10.0	10.4
Return on capital (%)	3.8	9.7	20.5	3.8	0.5	-1.7
Cash (£m)	7.9	4.8	19.8	21.8	5.8	14.2
Net debt (£m)	1,092	945	1,081	1,768	1,754	1,706
Net assets/share (p)	122	134	167	164	151	133

Source: company accounts.

Latest consensus anticipates around £93 million net profit this year, rising to £259 million in 2027 for normalised earnings per share (EPS) of 11.6p, hence a 15-month forward price/earnings (PE) ratio of 9.9x. 

Dividend growth is tipped to continue slightly ahead of inflation (although time will tell) with a rise from around 3.5% in recent years to 4% based on an 11.1p dividend in respect of 2027. That would imply a near full payout of earnings, but from the above table you can see a consistently strong cash flow record, hence, barring calamity, the dividend is well-propped.

Is this really the best risk-adjusted yield in UK equities?

I concede that my tease as to the “best possible, double-digit yield” lacks quantitative rigour and testing. I am taking a political view: the right-of-centre vote in British politics is divided between Reform, which is rather losing credibility, and the Conservatives, which are currently somewhat resurgent. That leaves the prospect of Labour propped possibly by the Lib Dems or Green Party. A left-of-centre, climate conscious government is the best scenario for renewable shares.

Current energy policy is most helpful: accelerating electrification to bring down its price relative to gas implies a tipping point, enhancing organic growth. Admittedly, it is hard to predict power prices according to adoption of EVs and heat pumps, but electricity demand in aggregate looks set to rise.

My initial “buy” at 96p related to a sense of market capitulation values in the renewables sector. As I get to know UK Wind in more detail – the presentation being helpful – at 115p I am more comfortable reiterating this, despite a conventional sense that a near double-digit yield flags high risk.

Yesterday’s City event is being rolled over into a 27 October live presentation for individual investors – see today’s RNS announcement – with scope for your own questions. 

Edmond Jackson is a freelance contributor and not a direct employee of interactive investor.

As well as attractive dividend income, a director has bought shares in this FTSE 250 company. Analyst Edmond Jackson assesses potential for total shareholder returns.

27th October 2026

by Edmond Jackson from interactive investor

Is the first meaningful director share purchase in this high-yielding real estate investment trust (REIT) for 14 months worth paying attention to?

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On 23 October, the chief financial officer at Primary Health Properties

PHP

 and his wife received 114,360 shares for nil consideration but also bought 54,659 shares for £50,000 at 91p. While hard to ascertain if this buying might relate to such a grant – as terms of a performance share plan – it is still a material purchase in the low end of an 89p to 107p range this year:

TradingView. Past performance is not a guide to future performance.

Aside from agreed regular small purchases by the founder and non-executive chair, the last material purchase was £150,000 worth at 92.1p by the senior non-executive director in August 2025.

This REIT likes to proclaim itself as having an unbroken 30-year track record of annual dividend growth, aided by upward-only rent reviews for healthcare properties that seem a lot more durable than, say, offices or shopping centres. A circa 8% dividend yield helps explain its popularity with retirees.

Yet total return in recent years has been frustrating; you could say the market prices for such yield as compensation for holding risk.

Macro conditions can significantly affect these shares

Management flaws are not necessarily implied. In particular, the 2022 derating occurred when interest rates rose to combat post-pandemic inflation, which also raised government bond (gilt) yields. Since REITS like this rely on long duration, fixed-income-like cash flows, rising (virtually) risk-free yields compress REIT valuations – what investors are willing to pay for rental income even when relatively secure.

The notorious September 2022 UK Mini-Budget also triggered a sell-off in property-related shares, yet there is currently a mild parallel by way of high gilt yields and interest rates probably having to rise to curb inflation. In the very near term perhaps the best we can say, macro-wise, is that Wednesday’s Autumn Budget possibly induces an aspect of relief rally in affected shares, if the chancellor at least is seen to be steadying the UK fiscal ship.

Since PHP is substantially reliant on government-backed NHS leases, you could say a radical left-wing government could take a tougher line – anti-private sector profits in a public service – similar to the way Prime Minister Andy Burnham is currently crusading against the water industry. It’s a bit like how the political Right threatens renewables, although I suspect in government they will have enough on their plate.

Radical response to lack of growth leads to debt dilemma

My chief concern is how PHP took the step of a major acquisition in July 2025 – to re-rate financial performance – which bumped up debt. It has also since led to the curiosity of joint ventures with financial institutions where PHS “seeds” (more accurately cedes) properties at a slight discount to net asset value (NAV) in return for cash lump sums that are then applied to reduce debt.

I confess that I am yet to figure out whether this is value-enhancing, neutral or worse, although it may explain why the shares at 92p trade at an 11.5% discount to adjusted net tangible assets per share (as of last June) on a reported basis.

I last mentioned PHP in July 2025 when they pipped private equity group Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in a takeover contest for listed rival Assura plc, creating the eighth-largest UK REIT with a portfolio of over £6 billion. At that time, 6.5% of PHP’s issued share capital was shorted, probably higher in total given disclosure related to positions over 0.5% versus 5.24% total shorting as of 19 October. That is significant in the context of a £2.4 billion company and, while I do not fear shorting (which can usefully depress market price for buying, with a baked-in rebound), we must always consider any rationale behind short positions.

Fifteen months ago, PHP proclaimed an inflection point in its property cycle due to “improving rental growth and stabilisation in yields”, and also a 10-year health plan for England just published, with the government re-iterating its commitment to strengthen the NHS. The Assura acquisition makes this difficult to test given that it bulks up PHP’s numbers. From the 30 July interim results, it is not possible to see like-for-like performance within a 123% advance in net rental income and 109% in adjusted earnings, albeit a more modest 9% rise in adjusted interim earnings per share (EPS), with reported EPS actually down 14%.

The interim statement described the combination with Assura as contributing to a strong set of results “supported by a robust operational performance”, with the outlook conclusion citing various political initiatives as supportive.

If an operational inflection point is present, might it be the case that high gilt yields offset this by way of tempering PHP’s share price? I think that has to be considered.

See from the table below how net debt jumped 2.5x from 2024 (grinding higher to £3.4 billion as of last June), which the market understandably would have factored in dividend risk, helping explain a volatile-sideways share price. Financial risk scores are adjusted to “cautious”.

Primary Health Properties – financial summary
Year end 31 Dec

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Turnover (£ million)	121	139	146	154	170	182	259
Operating profit (£m)	7.1	173	183	73.3	87.3	104	213
Net profit (£m)	-71.3	112	140	56.3	27.3	41.4	119
Operating margin (%)	5.9	124	126	47.6	51.4	57.5	82.2
Reported earnings/share (p)	-6.5	8.7	9.8	2.2	1.9	2.8	6.6
Normalised earnings/share (p)	2.1	8.4	13.5	1.8	1.8	2.8	9.2
Operational cashflow/share (p)	8.6	8.7	9.8	8.2	9.2	9.3	10.0
Capital expenditure/share (p)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Free cashflow/share (p)	8.6	8.7	9.8	8.2	9.2	9.3	10.0
Return on total capital (%)	0.3	6.6	6.6	2.6	3.2	4.1	3.6
Cash (£m)	143	104	33.4	29.1	3.2	3.5	20.0
Net debt (£m)	1,125	1,114	1,246	1,274	1,323	1,338	3,288
Net assets (£m)	1,229	1,414	1,500	1,482	1,424	1,376	2,554
Net assets per share (p)	101	108	113	111	107	103	98.4

Source: company accounts.

While there had already been two joint ventures across PHP’s portfolio, including with the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), the one declared last 19 October, with global institutional investor GIC, is most relevant to debt reduction. Twenty-seven private hospitals worth about £700 million will be “seeded” at a 5% discount to NAV in a 50:50 joint venture, with PHP receiving about £500 million to be applied for debt reduction. The CEO also proclaims the deal as enhancing the return on equity, which has varied from 2% to 6% but looks to be trending at over 8%.

Today, PHP has announced that its joint venture with USS will increase from £250 million to as high as £800 million, albeit PHP has just a 20% interest.

I have to say these joint ventures strike me as possible “dilution by other means” rather than a share issue, to cut debt, and it’s unclear whether the joint venture strategy was indicated for debt management when PHP bought Assura. It seems an after-case. The strategy is said to be supporting dividend security given that more earnings are freed from high-cost variable-rate debt, but that followed from bulking-up anyway, which in hindsight was not great given upward pressure now on rates.

A seemingly modest valuation

With consensus for normalised EPS around 7.5p based on roughly £200 million net profit, the forward price/earnings (PE) ratio of 12x appears proverbially modest. But I doubt it is significant to the valuation. The focus here is inflation-linked dividend growth and holding the share as part of a diversified income portfolio. The yield does, however, assume full distribution of projected earnings.

The shares rose to 108p by February then slid in March to 90p, trading volatile-sideways up to 97p. A current price of 92p is therefore at the lower end of the range albeit against attractive (near) risk-free gilt yields and prices.

Net debt should reduce to around £2.9 billion as a result of the GIC deal, where interim results showed it as £3.4 billion, with £78 million of finance costs taking 43% of operating profit. More “joint ventures” therefore look required, and I would prefer to see evidence both in terms of earnings and NAV, that they are not compromising. Like with any property assets right now, it is hard to assume upward revaluations are a certainty beyond a sense of replacement build cost inflation.

My conclusion therefore is that it is encouraging to see the CFO appear to reckon PHP shares rate a material “buy” at 92p. Healthcare provision plus the realities of a Labour government having to work with private sector provision constitute a reasonable tailwind. Mind a headwind of high gilt yields if they persist. 

I also find PHP has got itself into a corner with a major acquisition boosting debt at the wrong time, thus effectively requiring asset disposals to manage it. To upgrade firmly to “buy”, I would like more evidence of how this works out, hence I maintain a “hold” rating.

Edmond Jackson is a freelance contributor and not a direct employee of interactive investor.

Thursday 29 October

CQS Natural Resources Growth & Income PLC ex-dividend date
CQS New City High Yield Fund Ltd ex-dividend date
Ecofin Global Utilities & Infrastructure Trust PLC ex-dividend date
European Smaller Cos Trust Plc ex-dividend date
Fidelity Asian Values PLC ex-dividend date
Henderson Far East Income Ltd ex-dividend date
Invesco Global Equity Income Trust PLC ex-dividend date
JPMorgan Claverhouse IT PLC ex-dividend date
JPMorgan India Growth & Income PLC ex-dividend date
M&G Credit Income Investment Trust PLC ex-dividend date
Polar Capital Global Financials Trust PLC dividend payment date
Sequoia Economic Infrastructure Income Fund Ltd ex-dividend date
Supermarket Income REIT PLC ex-dividend date

XD dates are important because if you buy just before the xd date, you should earn 5 dividends in just over a year, therefore increasing the amount of cash for re-investment.