Only UKW (Greencoat UK Wind) has publicly available 2031–2032 dividend forecasts. For NESF, SEIT, FGEN, GCP, no public 2031–2032 forecasts exist — but we can derive credible forward estimates using their published dividend policies and the latest analyst projections.
Below is the clean, consolidated forecast table using the best available data from your search results.
(All figures per share, in pence. Forecasts are based on published dividend policies, inflation‑linkage rules, and available long‑range analyst projections.)
✅ 1. Greencoat UK Wind (UKW) — Only trust with explicit 2031–2032 forecasts
Source: Digrin long‑range dividend model.
2031:20.656p
2032:23.207p
These are based on UKW’s policy of RPI‑linked annual increases, which the trust has delivered for 12+ years.
🟧 2. NextEnergy Solar Fund (NESF)
Latest published projections extend only to 2028:
2026: 8.43p
2027: 8.56p
2028: 8.68p
NESF’s dividend growth trend is ~1.5% per year (inflation‑linked subsidies). Applying that forward:
Estimated (modelled)
2031: ≈ 9.07p
2032: ≈ 9.21p
🟧 3. SDCL Energy Efficiency Income Trust (SEIT)
Latest published projections extend to 2026:
2024: 6.24p
2025: 6.32p
2026: 6.75p
SEIT’s long‑term dividend growth trend is ~2% per year.
All yields use the latest live prices from search:
NESF: 46.30p
SEIT: 43.05p
UKW: 99.18p
FGEN: 73.80p
GCP: 74.40p
Dividend forecasts (from earlier modelling + UKW published long‑range model):
Trust
2031 Dividend
2032 Dividend
NESF
9.07p
9.21p
SEIT
7.45p
7.60p
UKW
20.656p
23.207p
FGEN
8.85p
9.10p
GCP
7.00p
7.00p
📊 Forward Yield Table (Based on Today’s Prices)
2031 Forward Yields
Trust
Price
2031 Div
2031 Yield
NESF
46.30p
9.07p
19.6%
SEIT
43.05p
7.45p
17.3%
UKW
99.18p
20.656p
20.8%
FGEN
73.80p
8.85p
12.0%
GCP
74.40p
7.00p
9.4%
2032 Forward Yields
Trust
Price
2032 Div
2032 Yield
NESF
46.30p
9.21p
19.9%
SEIT
43.05p
7.60p
17.7%
UKW
99.18p
23.207p
23.4%
FGEN
73.80p
9.10p
12.3%
GCP
74.40p
7.00p
9.4%
🏆 Yield Ranking (Highest → Lowest)
2031
UKW – 20.8%
NESF – 19.6%
SEIT – 17.3%
FGEN – 12.0%
GCP – 9.4%
2032
UKW – 23.4%
NESF – 19.9%
SEIT – 17.7%
FGEN – 12.3%
GCP – 9.4%
🔍 Interpretation
UKW dominates due to its RPI‑linked dividend policy and depressed share price.
NESF & SEIT deliver extremely high forward yields because prices are deeply discounted relative to inflation‑linked cashflows.
FGEN sits in the middle: stable, but not explosive.
GCP remains a flat 7p payer, so its yield is purely price‑driven.
Whilst there is likely to be lots of changes in the sector before the dates above but if the fcast is only partly correct, the long term outlook will be very interesting.
The 2032 fcast yield for UKW is 23.4p, a yield on the current buying price. would be 23.5%. IF that is only partly achieved the share price will not be 99p.
Here is the pure, maximum‑monthly‑income ETF basket built specifically for a UK investor, using only UCITS‑compliant, exchange‑listed, monthly‑paying ETFs.
🔥 The Pure Maximum‑Monthly‑Income ETF Basket (UCITS)
Objective: Maximise monthly cashflow, not long‑term growth Style: High‑yield bonds + global dividends + covered‑call income Currency: GBP‑accessible UCITS ETFs Distribution: Monthly (or effectively monthly via staggered holdings)
1) Global High‑Dividend Core (Monthly)
Purpose: Reliable, equity‑based income Yield Range: ~4.5%–6% Role: The “equity backbone” of the income stream
Examples of ETF types in this slot:
MSCI World High Dividend Yield UCITS ETFs
Global Select Dividend UCITS ETFs
These provide global diversification and stable dividend flow.
2) High‑Yield Bond Engine (Monthly)
Purpose: Maximise raw yield Yield Range: ~6%–9% Role: The “income engine” of the basket
These ETFs typically hold:
Global high‑yield corporate bonds
Short‑duration high‑yield bonds
EM government bonds (USD‑denominated)
They are the highest consistent monthly payers in the UCITS universe.
3) Covered‑Call Income Boosters (Monthly / Near‑Monthly)
Purpose: Generate option‑premium income Yield Range: ~8%–12% Role: The “turbocharger” of the basket
Covered‑call ETFs generate income by selling call options on equity indices. They sacrifice some upside for very high monthly distributions.
📦 The Basket Structure (Clean & Powerful)
A) 40% — Global High‑Dividend ETFs (Monthly)
Smooth, diversified income
Lower volatility than pure equities
Anchors the portfolio
B) 40% — High‑Yield Bond ETFs (Monthly)
Highest consistent monthly payouts
Strong income engine
More stable than equities
C) 20% — Covered‑Call ETFs (Monthly / Near‑Monthly)
Could value stocks offer the remedy to an AI bubble?
Thursday, May 7, 2026
Hannah Williford
Content Writer
Related news
The lofty valuations of AI stocks in the past few years have dredged up memories for some of the time before the dotcom bubble burst in 2000.
This burst, which led to steep fall in the MSCI World over a period of two years, was due to overinvestment in internet companies that eventually couldn’t live up to their value despite the internet becoming a part of everyday life. It’s simple to see the similarities to today: even with a general consensus that AI will be a world-changing technology, it’s hard to be clear on the companies which will benefit most.
But a striking phenomenon of the dotcom bubble bursting was the performance of value stocks in the aftermath, which shot up as the rest of the market fell. The past is never a perfect indicator of what will happen to markets in the future, but some investors believe value stocks could deliver the same bumper returns if the AI bubble burst.
Investors can see this through the Fama-French HML Factor Data. This is an educational data measure that shows how value-driven stocks perform in comparison to growth stocks. The chart below shows how dramatically value outperformed growth in the period immediately following the dot-com crash.
What does value really mean?
There is no single definition of what qualifies a stock as ‘value’. Generally, it refers to stocks that are unloved by the market, but if these stocks are worth more than their price will depend on who you ask. This makes it a popular area of the market for fund managers that select their own stocks, because it allows them to use their own strategies to see appeal they think others, or indices, might be missing.
Indices offer value options too, but their performance has differed widely based on criteria. The MSCI World Value index, for example, has lagged behind the standard MSCI World in the past five years, with returns of 65.8% and 76%, respectively. But the MSCI World Enhanced Value Index has beat both with a 101.65% return.
How are these value metrics so different? MSCI World Value Index chooses its holdings based on book value (essentially the value of a company’s assets) divided by share price, dividend yields, and 12-month forward earnings multiples. It then gets a score to sort it between value and growth. But a stock can fall in both of these baskets which means the returns of this index aren’t always so different from the broader market.
MSCI World Enhanced Value, on the other hand, uses different metrics, has stricter criteria, and an all-in or all- out approach for if stocks qualify. This creates a smaller qualifying group and a much different return than the standard MSCI World.
This stricter criteria meant that on a longer- term view, including in the early 2000s, the enhanced value strategy won out. However, in times that were strong for growth, such as the 2010s, this index lagged behind.
Balancing growth and value
Value stocks don’t come without risk, and some are cheap for a reason. By relying them on completely, investors would likely have missed out on some of the most impressive market performers in recent years, such as Nvidia and Alphabet. For this reason, many investors choose to use a blend. Indices like the MSCI World are, by nature, weighted more heavily towards growth. So having a separate portfolio weighting that is aimed specifically at value can be a way to even out this risk.
Some value stocks will present a smoother ride than broader equity markets, as many measures of value include stocks that pay high levels of dividends, which tend to be more mature businesses. But other value stocks are discounted severely because the company has had a difficult period. This does involve risk, but it can still be a diversifier to other parts of your portfolio.
Value investments can be hard to sniff out, because it involves deep analysis of why they are trading more cheaply in the first place, as well as what their potential is for the future. There’s always a possibility of buying a stock that looks good value at the time, but keeps sinking instead of recovering. Some prefer to leave it up to the experts and invest through funds. The table shows the best performing value funds of the past 10 years offered on AJ Bell’s platform. Note that these funds will each have different metrics to constitute value, and past returns don’t guarantee future performance.
Appointment of Investment Manager and Company Secretary
The Board of Murray Income Trust PLC (the “Company”) is pleased to announce that, further to its previous announcements, it has entered into an investment management agreement with Artemis Fund Managers Limited (“Artemis”) as the Company’s new alternative investment fund manager, which has become effective today. The investment management agreement reflects the heads of terms announced on 20 November 2025.
Looking at the performance table above, Artemis have been appointed managers of MUT. The yield is only 4% so you would have to split your investment and pair trade it with a higher yielder to maintain a blended yield of 7%. General advice not trading advice.
Lindsell Train Investment Trust – “Market mispricing AI risk”
07 May 2026
QuotedData
“Market mispricing AI risk”
During periods of global market uncertainty, the companies held by Lindsell Train Investment Trust (LTI) and its manager, Lindsell Train Limited (LTL), have tended to perform well as investors seek durable and resilient cash flows. Whilst some holdings – particularly those in the consumer staple sector – have proven defensive amid volatility linked to the Iran war, growing fears around the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on software and data businesses has hit LTI and LTL hard.
This has been particularly acute at portfolio holding RELX. LTL argues that the market’s assessment is wrong. In sectors such as legal and financial, the cost of error is extremely high, and regulatory barriers make the datasets valuable and essential for the successful application of AI tools. Reflecting this, LTI used market weakness to initiate a position in US credit scoring giant FICO (which was already held in LTL’s Global strategy) in February.
Whilst funds under management at LTL have continued to fall, the company has launched a new $200m strategy focused on international equities, seeded by its substantial cash pile and a longstanding client.
Maximise returns over the long-term
LTI aims to maximise total returns over the long term, while preserving shareholders’ capital. It invests in a concentrated portfolio of global equities that it has identified as market-leading and that benefit from high returns on equity. It also invests in a range of Lindsell Train-managed funds and the unlisted security of its investment manager, Lindsell Train Limited.
Year ended
Share price total return (%)
NAV total return (%)
MSCI World Index TR (%)
30/04/2022
(11.5)
(4.2)
6.4
30/04/2023
(10.9)
10.1
3.1
30/04/2024
(19.5)
1.8
18.8
30/04/2025
10.7
12.2
5.1
30/04/2026
(23.6)
(17.7)
27.0
Source: Bloomberg, Marten & Co
Fund profile
Concentrated portfolio of 13 global equity stocks plus Lindsell Train funds
Lindsell Train Investment Trust (LTI) aims to deliver long-term total returns while preserving the real value of capital. It invests in a concentrated portfolio of 13 global “heritage” companies, alongside selected Lindsell Train funds and a stake in its manager, Lindsell Train Limited (LTL). The LTL management fee for LT managed funds and other funds that LTL manages are rebated back to LTI, so as to avoid double charging of fees.
As of March 2026, global equities made up 62.4% of NAV, with look-through exposure to 49 holdings. The trust is benchmarked against the MSCI World Index (in sterling) but is managed independently, with an active share close to 100%. LTI was launched in 2001 and is listed on the premium segment of the main market of the London Stock Exchange. LTI’s board of directors is the company’s AIFM and receives no remuneration for doing so.
Investment approach
LTL focuses on holding a small number of high-conviction, high-quality companies for the long term. It believes concentration can reduce risk more effectively than broad diversification. These businesses typically have durable competitive advantages and long histories (average age of LTI’s direct equity holdings of around 147 years).
Symbiotic relationship with LTL
LTI has a symbiotic relationship with LTL, helping seed new funds and benefitting from their growth. Its initial £66,000 investment in LTL grew significantly and stood at £28.2m (as at the end of March 2026), peaking at 48% of NAV in 2021 before declining to 19.8% by March 2026 due to weaker performance and reduced assets under management.
Market backdrop
War in Iran has heightened global geopolitical uncertainty
Global market uncertainty has heightened with the war in Iran intensifying geopolitical tension and upending a global economic recovery. Growth expectations have been lowered on the back of the energy price shock and re-accelerating inflation, with central banks being forced to shelve rate cutting plans as a higher-for-longer interest rate backdrop emerges.
At the same time, investors are also evaluating how artificial intelligence (AI) could reshape entire industries and sectors, distinguishing between likely beneficiaries and those at risk of disruption.
Markets have become highly event-driven and volatile, with concerns about inflation, oil prices, interest rates, and geopolitics all affecting sentiment. The impact of the uncertainty caused by both unstable geopolitics and the threat posed by AI has been great on LTI and LTL’s portfolios. We look at both here.
Geopolitical tension
Defensive stocks back in focus
The war in Iran and wider instability in the Middle East has brought defensive stocks back into focus. While energy, defence/aerospace and selective commodity stocks have made substantial gains, other safe haven sectors, including banking, have also benefitted. LTL’s consumer staples exposure has likewise proven relatively resilient in recent months. Within LTI’s portfolio, beauty and personal care giant Unilever was up double-digits in the year before it was reported that it was selling its food business in March (which we detail on page 9). Meanwhile, snacks behemoth Mondelez and soft drinks manufacturer AG Barr were both up in the weeks following the outbreak of war.
All four boast long-term track records of durable and growing revenues and should continue to reliably compound for years and decades to come. In the last period of significant market volatility – at the start of 2025 when tariff uncertainty and the DeepSeek large language model (LLM) launched – LTI and LTL’s portfolio held up relatively well, while tech-dominated indices, including the S&P 500 and NASDAQ faltered. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows LTI’s NAV return relative to the MSCI World Index.
Figure 1: LTI NAV total return relative to the MSCI World Index1
Source: Bloomberg, Marten & Co. Note 1) rebased to 100 at 31 December 2024
The benefits of its defensive positioning were not quite as pronounced in the aftermath of the start of the war in Iran this year, coming at a time when a number of LTL’s data businesses were caught up in the widespread software sell-off.
Software sell-off
Data businesses suffered large sell-off
Following the launch by Anthropic of industry specific plugins for Claude Cowork in January – targeting particular verticals such as legal and finance – a period of indiscriminate selling of data and digital platform businesses ensued. The concern is that cheap AI tools may soon commoditise data provision altogether or at least impact future growth prospects.
A number of LTI and LTL’s holdings were caught up in this, not least London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) and RELX.
LTL believes that the market has misjudged both companies, underestimating the long-term value of the datasets on which the new AI models depend. In sectors such as legal, risk, financial, and medical, the cost of error is extremely high, while much of the underlying data is protected by clear physical and regulatory barriers, meaning a significant proportion remains entirely unavailable to large language models (LLMs). As a result, trusted, accurate, reference-grade data should remain valuable even as AI tools become more widely adopted.
Figure 2: RELX (GBP)
Source: Bloomberg
RELX, which provides services to the global scientific, legal and insurance industries, already offers similar AI-enabled workflow tools. LTL argues that, whilst new AI applications are being developed, the value is less likely to accrue to the models themselves but more to the owners of the datasets upon which they rely. Both RELX and LSEG possess clear data moats. RELX, for example, has amassed over 100 billion legal documents and grows this data daily – the vast majority of which contain proprietary content. This legal data is rarely more than 1%-2% of a law firm’s cost base, LTL estimates. However, it is critical to their function and does not seem an obvious target for cost savings.
LTL believes that investors have overly discounted the long-term earnings potential of these and other data businesses, creating a buying opportunity. As such, LTI has recently initiated a position in US credit-scoring giant FICO (which we detail on page 10).
Investment process
Investment universe of 150 companies
LTL operates within a small universe of potential investments, typically no more than 150 companies, due to its strict focus on heritage businesses with predictable earnings (supported by pricing power and/or intellectual property), low capital intensity and sustainably high returns on capital. As a result, LTI has maintained a highly concentrated portfolio since its launch in 2001, averaging around 15 holdings (currently 13).
Most qualifying companies tend to fall into a limited number of broad sectors:
Consumer branded goods;
Internet, media, software; and
Financials and networks.
Bottom-up approach without reference to benchmark
The portfolio is constructed on a purely “bottom-up” basis, with no reference to benchmarks. Each potential investment undergoes a rigorous due diligence process (sometimes lasting several years) including meetings with management and detailed industry analysis.
Valuation is assessed using multiple methods. Whilst LTL does not rely on traditionally constructed discounted cash flow (DCF) models, its approach shares many of its core principles, particularly in focusing on the long-term sustainability of returns of a company. Companies identified as offering the best value are selected for inclusion in the portfolio.
ESG integration
Signatory of UN Principles for Responsible Investment
LTI’s manager is a signatory to the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, the UK Stewardship Code, and the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative. It actively engages with portfolio companies on ESG issues, including climate change, and measures portfolio-level carbon emissions, footprint (tCO₂e/$m invested), and intensity (tCO₂e/$m sales) to assess exposure to climate-related risks.
LTL believes that companies with strong ESG standards are likely to be more durable and deliver superior long-term returns. Accordingly, ESG analysis is embedded in the investment process and covers environmental factors (including climate change), social, governance (including remuneration and capital allocation), as well as cyber resilience, responsible data use, human rights, anti-corruption, and reputational risks.
ESG factors influence portfolio decisions
Where ESG factors are expected to materially affect long-term prospects, they are incorporated into valuation assumptions, particularly long-term growth rates, and influence portfolio decisions, including whether to initiate, hold, or exit positions.
Consistent with its philosophy, LTL avoids:
capital-intensive sectors such as energy, commodities, and mining, including companies involved in coal, oil, or gas extraction; and
industries considered socially harmful or exposed to regulatory or litigation risk, such as tobacco, gambling, and arms manufacturing.
Active engagement with company management on ESG and stewardship issues is a core part of the strategy. Whilst generally supportive of management, LTL will seek to influence decisions where it disagrees with company actions.
Investment policy and restrictions
LTI can invest globally across a broad range of financial assets, including equities (listed and unlisted), bonds, funds and cash, with no sector or geographic constraints. Individual holdings are limited to 15% of gross assets. It may also invest up to 25% in LTL-managed funds (subject to board approval) and may retain holdings in LTL to benefit from its long-term growth.
The company does not invest for control purposes and will not allocate more than 15% of gross assets to other closed-ended investment funds.
Exits
Low single-digit portfolio turnover rate
LTL maintains a low single-digit portfolio turnover rate, with LTI’s turnover even lower. Investments are typically held for the long term, reflecting its conviction in the value of owning high-quality businesses over extended periods.
Positions are reduced or exited only for compelling reasons, such as a share price exceeding intrinsic value, or erosion of competitive advantages.
Long-term holding avoids transaction fees
This long-term approach minimises transaction costs, which the manager views as a drag on capital, and requires patience and discipline to look beyond short-term market noise. Exit decisions may also be influenced by the availability of alternative opportunities with stronger upside potential, with the manager typically identifying two or three vetted candidates at any given time.
Asset allocation
Figure 3: Breakdown of LTI’s portfolio at 31 March 2026
Source: Lindsell Train Investment Trust
Figure 4: LTI portfolio by location of underlying revenue at 30 Sept 20251
Source: Lindsell Train Investment Trust. Note 1) On a look-through basis, aggregating direct holdings with indirect holdings held by LTL funds
At 31 March 2026, more than 60% of LTI’s portfolio value was invested in global equities, with LTL making up almost 20%. Over a third of underlying portfolio revenue originated from the US (on a look-through basis including positions in LTL), while Europe accounted for a quarter of revenues and the UK just over a fifth.
Figure 5: LTI holdings at 31 March 2026
Stock/holding
Sector
As at 31/03/26 (%)
As at 30/09/25 (%)
Change (%)
Lindsell Train Limited (LTL)
Unlisted security
19.8
24.4
(4.6)
London Stock Exchange Group
Financials
14.4
11.3
3.1
Lindsell Train North American Equity Fund
LTL managed fund
13.5
12.2
1.3
Nintendo
Communication services
11.1
14.0
(2.9)
RELX
Industrials
6.4
7.4
(1.0)
A.G. Barr
Consumer staples
4.7
4.0
0.7
Unilever
Consumer staples
4.6
5.0
(0.4)
Diageo
Consumer staples
4.2
4.4
(0.2)
Thermo Fisher Scientific
Healthcare
3.2
2.5
0.7
Mondelez International
Consumer staples
3.0
3.3
(0.3)
Universal Music Group
Communication services
2.6
3.1
(0.5)
Heineken
Consumer staples
2.4
2.1
0.3
PayPal
Financials
2.2
2.6
(0.4)
Finsbury Growth & Income Trust Plc
Financials
2.1
2.1
0.0
Laurent-Perrier
Consumer staples
2.0
1.7
0.3
FICO
Financials
1.7
–
1.7
Cash & equivalent
–
2.1
0.2
1.9
Source: Lindsell Train Investment Trust, Marten & Co
Universal Music Group (UMG)
Figure 6: UMG (EUR)
Source: Bloomberg
We explained LTL’s investment rationale for UMG, which it bought into at the end of 2023, in detail in our initiation note and the manager says that this has not changed. Its belief that the Euronext Amsterdam-listed company was vastly undervalued has been proven by a £48bn bid for the company by Pershing Square Capital Management. Announced earlier this month, the deal values UMG’s shares at €25 compared to its previous closing price of €17.05.
If it goes ahead, shareholders in UMG will receive €9.4bn in cash and 0.77 new UMG shares as part of the deal, which would see UMG merge with Pershing Square SPARC Holdings, the special purpose vehicle established four years ago to make a large acquisition, and list on the New York stock exchange. Under the transaction, 17% of UMG shares will be bought back and cancelled while preserving the company’s investment grade balance sheet, and a new dividend policy may also be adopted.
UMG’s shares have been depressed since listing in 2021, with concerns over French conglomerate Bolloré Group’s 18% stake, the postponement of UMG’s US listing, under-utilisation of its balance sheet, and the threat of AI deepfakes on music industry revenues weighing on performance.
The LTL team believes that that whilst AI can generate huge volumes of music-like content, it does not change the value of real, established, and in-demand catalogues. UMG’s ownership of major music rights, where it controls roughly a third of the world’s recorded music (ahead of the other two major players Sony and Warner), puts it in a strong position to push for better pricing from streaming platforms such as Spotify, it adds.
The payout model currently used by the platforms – based on a simple pro-rata share of listening – is expected to improve and evolve allowing for minimum payments or fixed-value arrangements tied to the worth of catalogues. This would give UMG leverage to force platforms to absorb higher content costs or raise their own subscription prices. Changes would likely take time to flow through because UMG needs to align terms across multiple streaming partners, the manager says, but the direction of travel is positive.
Unilever
Figure 7: Unilever (GBP)
Source: Bloomberg
FTSE 100 conglomerate Unilever has been a long-term holding for LTL and a consistent presence in LTI’s portfolio. Last month, the group announced it had reached a deal to sell its food business to spice maker McCormick, creating a $66bn company with $20bn of annual revenues.
As part of the cash-and-stock transaction, Unilever shareholders will own 65% of the combined group, with McCormick owning the remaining 35%. Unilever will also receive $15.7bn of cash from McCormick under the deal terms. It has been structured as a so-called Reverse Morris Trust, which allows the parent company (Unilever) to minimise its tax liabilities on the disposal if it retains a majority stake in the divested enterprise.
Unilever says that the deal, which is expected to complete by mid-2027 subject to McCormick shareholder approval, will transform the company from a multi-category conglomerate into a more focused, pureplay beauty and personal care company. The division accounts for a large portion of group revenues and is seen as faster-growing sectors.
Unilever has been pivoting away from food over the past decade to focus on beauty and wellbeing categories – last year spinning-off its Magnum ice cream holding into an independent entity.
Shareholders reacted negatively towards the McCormick deal, with its share price falling heavily since first being reported in March. LTI had reduced its position in Unilever earlier in the year, before the price weakened. The manager believes that the greater attraction of Unilever’s household and personal care portfolio has put selling pressure on the remains of Unilever’s food business. It thinks that it is this, rather than the merits of the deal, that has negatively impacted Unilever’s share price.
FICO
Figure 8: FICO (USD)
Source: Bloomberg
Partly funded by the exit of Unilever’s Magnum ice cream business noted above, LTI initiated a 2% holding in US-listed credit scoring giant FICO in February. It has been a constituent of LTL’s global equity portfolio since 2022, and the manager took advantage of share price weakness linked to the perceived threat from AI to add to its position.
FICO has two core businesses: the credit scores segment and the software arm. LTL notes that much of FICO’s growth has come from pricing power, with significant further room to raise prices after decades of undercharging. It believes that the scores business still has a large growth runway ahead of it, with opportunities to increase pricing and tweak its charging model, as well as capturing more of the value chain. Meanwhile, the software business’s shift to a new cloud-based platform has presented it with greater opportunities to cross-sell its risk and fraud prevention services.
LTL believes the AI disruption fears are misplaced in FICO’s case due to the sensitivity and protection given to the underlying bureau data and the regulatory burden around the scores themselves.
Diageo
Figure 9: Diageo (GBP)
Source: Bloomberg
A major recent development at drinks giant Diageo was the announcement of the halving of its dividend. New chief executive Dave Lewis said the company had taken the decision to reduce the pay-out in order to strengthen its balance sheet and drive long-term growth.
Lewis had been appointed earlier this year to turnaround the ailing company, which owns some of the best-selling premium spirit brands globally but has suffered a collapse in its share price since its peak in 2021. The dollar-based company declared an interim dividend of 20 cents per share in half-year results, down from 40.5 cents. Going forward, it said it would target paying 30-50% of earnings with a minimum annual dividend of 50 cents.
LTL says that it supports the dividend cut, providing it helps protect the balance sheet and avoids more damaging actions like selling valuable assets. Whilst acknowledging the disappointment, it believes that the core long-term strengths of the business remain intact: strong brands, durable market positions, and growth potential in markets such as India.
Diageo’s share price weakness has been exacerbated recently, with the company being uniquely hit by Trump’s tariffs, as a significant portion of its products are imported into the US from Mexico and Canada. Another concern for shareholders stems from the fact that people are drinking less. The manager says that the data points to a more nuanced story, however.
LTI’s performance is still largely determined by that of its largest exposure, LTL, which at the end of March 2026 accounted for 19.8% of the portfolio, down from 24.5% six months earlier. LTL has experienced substantial investor outflows in recent years. Funds under management (FUM) at LTL have fallen to £9.8bn in September 2025, from a peak of £24.3bn in July 2021. Annual management fees make up almost 99% of LTL’s total revenues and 80% of net profits are paid to shareholders in dividends, meaning that the contribution made by LTL to LTI’s revenues remains considerable.
One positive development amid declining FUM is the recent launch of a new international strategy (EAFE) focused on the developed world excluding the US, which complements LTL’s four existing strategies spanning global, UK, Japan and North American equities. LTL says that this strategy has been under consideration for some time, but current market valuations and growing demand for international equities made the timing particularly compelling.
Alongside the establishment of an International LLC (funded with balance sheet capital) a longstanding client also seeded the strategy through two segregated mandates. As a result, the strategy has launched with over $200m in AUM. The strategy will be co-managed by James Bullock and Ben van Leeuwen (profiles of whom can be found on page 16).
Performance
Direct comparisons with benchmarks and the global investment companies peer group are difficult to make due to LTI’s unique investment policy and the concentrated nature of its portfolio. Figure 10 shows that LTI’s NAV has fallen sharply over the past year relative to both its peer group and the MSCI World Index, as FUM at LTL has fallen further and sentiment towards its software holdings was hit by AI disruption fears.
Figure 10: LTI NAV total return performance relative to benchmark and peer group1
Source: Bloomberg, Marten & Co. Note 1) peer group is defined on below.
Despite the poor performance over five years, LTI’s 10-year NAV total return is still greater than both the peer group and the benchmark, as shown in Figure 11, reflecting the exceptional contribution of LTL in prior years.
Figure 11: Cumulative total return performance over periods ending 30 April 2026
6 months (%)
1 year (%)
3 years (%)
5 years (%)
10 years (%)
LTI share price
(14.6)
(23.6)
(31.9)
(46.3)
43.2
LTI NAV
(19.3)
(17.7)
(6.0)
(0.9)
262.2
MSCI World Index
3.3
27.0
58.6
73.9
254.9
Peer group average NAV
1.4
20.9
44.8
67.6
241.1
Source: Bloomberg, Marten & Co. Note 1) peer group is defined below.
Peer group analysis
Figure 12: Peer group comparative data as at 5 May 2026
Premium / (discount) (%)
Dividend yield (%)
Ongoing charge (%)
Market cap (£m)
Lindsell Train
(15.6)
7.0
0.80
120
Alliance Witan
(5.5)
2.2
0.47
4,823
AVI Global Trust
(8.4)
1.8
0.85
1,024
Bankers
(7.7)
2.0
0.51
1,313
Brunner
(8.3)
1.7
0.61
644
F&C
(8.1)
1.3
0.45
6,115
Mid Wynd
(1.7)
1.1
0.64
211
Monks
(5.4)
0.0
0.43
2,447
Scottish Mortgage
3.5
0.3
0.31
15,568
Sector median
(6.5)
1.9
0.56
3,585
LTI rank
9/9
1/9
8/9
9/9
Source: QuotedData website
Up-to-date information on LTI and its peers is available on our website
LTI is a constituent of the AIC’s Global sector, which is currently comprises nine companies. LTI’s discount is the widest among the peer group, while its dividend yield is far higher than the peer group median due to its unique structure and revenue contribution from LTL. The ongoing charges ratio is at the top end of this peer group, reflecting its small market cap (the smallest in the peer group), although we would argue that none of these charges are particularly high.
Figure 13: Peer group cumulative NAV total return data as at 30 April 2026
6 months
1 year
3 years
5 years
10 years
Lindsell Train
(19.3)
(17.7)
(6.0)
(0.9)
262.2
Alliance Witan
0.2
14.2
36.5
71.9
190.7
AVI Global Trust
1.4
13.1
40.7
88.6
205.1
Bankers
3.7
27.5
44.3
68.4
204.3
Brunner
5.1
22.0
42.5
98.0
214.5
F&C
3.6
24.9
55.8
94.4
242.2
Mid Wynd
(8.3)
1.4
8.3
24.3
143.4
Monks
0.2
29.3
52.2
49.1
254.3
Scottish Mortgage
5.2
35.2
78.3
46.3
474.0
Sector median
1.4
20.9
44.8
67.6
241.1
AGT rank
9/9
9/9
9/9
9/9
2/9
Source: Bloomberg, Marten & Co
Dividend
Figure 14: LTI dividend history
Source: Lindsell Train Investment Trust
LTI’s dividend is largely funded by the revenue income it receives from LTL, which accounts for around 72% of LTI’s total revenue. With FUM at LTL continuing to decline, further pressure in LTI’s dividend has become inevitable. For 2025, the dividend was £42 per share, down 18.4% on 2024. Further declines in LTL’s FUM will impact LTI’s future dividend, unless the board decides to draw upon revenue reserves, which seems unlikely.
Premium/(discount)
Figure 15: LTI discount over five years
Source: Bloomberg, Marten & Co
LTI’s discount has moved within a range of 10.4% to 24.7% and averaged 17.5% over the 12 months ended 30 April 2026. As of publishing, the company’s discount had narrowed to 15.6%.
As we have discussed, LTL’s quality-focused investing style has been out of favour for some time and has contributed to LTI’s wider discount, while the continued shrinking of FUM at LTL has also been a significant factor.
The board has indicated that it believes using share buybacks as a tool to reduce the discount would prove ineffective. To fund a buyback programme, the company would need to sell existing quoted investments, which would result in an increase in LTL’s percentage weighting within LTI’s portfolio and an increased expense ratio for remaining shareholders.
Fees and costs
Investment management fee of 0.6% of the lower of market cap or NAV
Under the terms of the investment management agreement, Lindsell Train Limited is entitled to receive an annual fee of 0.6%, calculated on the lower of adjusted market capitalisation or adjusted NAV. In the year to 31 March 2025, the manager was paid £819,000 (2024: £976,000).
The manager is also entitled to receive a performance fee, which is calculated annually at a rate of 10% of the value of any positive relative performance versus the benchmark in a financial year. Relative performance is measured by taking the lower of the NAV or average market price, taking into account dividends, at the end of each financial year and comparing the percentage annual change with the total return of the benchmark. A performance fee will only be paid out if the annual change is both above the benchmark and is a positive figure. No performance fee has been paid since 2021.
For the year ended 31 March 2025, LTI’s ongoing charges ratio was 0.80% (2024: 0.83%).
Capital structure
LTI has a simple capital structure with one class of ordinary share in issue. Its ordinary shares have a premium main market listing on the London Stock Exchange and, as at 5 May 2026, there were 20,000,000 in issues and none held in treasury.
Gearing
LTI is permitted to borrow up to a maximum of 50% of NAV, but it does not currently use gearing to enhance returns, in part reflecting the size and risk associated with the company’s unlisted investment in LTL.
Financial calendar
The trust’s year-end is 31 March. The annual results are usually released in June (interims in December) and its AGMs are usually held in September of each year. An annual dividend is usually paid in August.
Major shareholders
Figure 16: Major shareholders as at 5 May 2026
Source: Bloomberg
Management team
LTL is headed up by Michael Lindsell and Nick Train, who co-founded the business in 2000. The wider investment team comprises four members, all of whom are portfolio managers following recent promotions in March 2026.
Michael Lindsell
Michael co-founded LTL in 2000 and is the firm’s chief executive. He is the portfolio manager for Japanese equity portfolios and jointly manages global equity portfolios. Michael has over 40 years’ experience in investment management, including heading GT Management’s global and international funds. Following the acquisition of GT by Invesco in 1998, he was appointed head of the combined global product team. Michael has a degree in Zoology from the University of Bristol.
Nick Train
Nick co-founded LTL and is the firm’s chairman. He is the portfolio manager for UK equity portfolios and jointly manages global equity portfolios. Nick has over 40 years’ experience in investment management, including as head of global equities at M&G Investment Management. He previously he spent 17 years at GT Management. Nick has a degree in Modern History from the University of Oxford.
Board
LTI’s board comprises six non-executive directors. All are independent of the manager with the exception of Michael Lindsell. The company’s articles of association limit the aggregate fees payable to the directors to a total of £200,000 per annum, leaving comfortable headroom at the current fee levels.
Board policy is for all directors to retire and offer themselves for re-election annually. Neither the chairman nor any other non-executive director should normally serve for more than nine years, although this may be extended for a limited period where it is considered in the interests of the company or shareholders.
As is illustrated in Figure 17, all of LTI’s directors have personal investments in the trust, which we believe aligns directors’ interests with those of shareholders.
LTI’s differentiated investment approach offers a way of diversifying investors’ portfolios
LTI’s returns can deviate markedly from those of peers and global indices
Opportunities
Threats
Investment approach could return to favour, especially if volatility persists
Focused portfolio brings stock-specific risk
AI commoditises data provision, negatively impacting LTI stocks
Source: Marten & Co
Bull vs. bear case
Figure 19: Bull vs. bear case for LTI
Aspect
Bull case
Bear case
Performance
Performance trend reverses and investment approach is widely recognised
Momentum-driven stocks continue to drive indices, to the detriment of LTI returns
Dividends
LTI’s dividend yield is by far the highest of the peer group
Dividend falls as revenue income it receives from LTL continues to dwindle
Outlook
Quality, growth investing comes back into favour
Elevated macroeconomic risks and uncertainty over impact of AI make the outlook hard to predict
Discount
LTI’s discount narrows as enduring quality of portfolio companies acknowledged
Underperformance of peers and indices over past five years creates further selling pressure
Source: Marten & Co
Source: Marten & Co
IMPORTANT INFORMATION
This marketing communication has been prepared for Lindsell Train Investment Trust Plc by Marten & Co (which is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority) and is non-independent research as defined under Article 36 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25 April 2016 supplementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID). It is intended for use by investment professionals as defined in article 19 (5) of the Financial Services Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005. Marten & Co is not authorised to give advice to retail clients and, if you are not a professional investor, or in any other way are prohibited or restricted from receiving this information, you should disregard it. The note does not have regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and needs of any specific person who may receive it.
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